The State of American Federalism, 2003-2004: Polarized Politics and Federalist Principles by Krane, Dale
University of Nebraska at Omaha
DigitalCommons@UNO
Public Administration Faculty Publications School of Public Administration
Summer 2004
The State of American Federalism, 2003-2004:
Polarized Politics and Federalist Principles
Dale Krane
University of Nebraska at Omaha, dkrane@unomaha.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/pubadfacpub
Part of the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of
Public Administration at DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Public Administration Faculty Publications by an authorized
administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please
contact unodigitalcommons@unomaha.edu.
Recommended Citation
Krane, Dale, "The State of American Federalism, 2003-2004: Polarized Politics and Federalist Principles" (2004). Public Administration
Faculty Publications. 57.
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/pubadfacpub/57
The State of American Federalism, 
2003-2004: Polarized Politics and 
Federalist Principles 
Dale Krane 
University of Nebraska at Omaha 
By Bush s third year in office, the nation was embroiled in three wars overseas and a political war at 
home. The progress made toward a functioning Iraqi government was eclipsed by violent resistance and 
by administrative scandals. The 9/11 Commission hearings uncovered "missed opportunities" in 
intelligence and repudiated the two principal reasons for the invasion of Iraq. Slow job growth, rising 
prices for energy and health care, and fears over outsourcing dragged the president's approval ratings to 
new lows. Senator john Kerry emerged from a large group of Democrats to become the party s putative 
nominee, and both he and the president wasted little time in attacking each other: Government revenues 
continued to be anemic, but there were signs the worst of the state government ftscal crisis had passed. 
Washington enacted the first-ever prescription-drug benefit for Medicare recipients and continued to 
ignore the worseningfederal debt. State governments produced innovative as well as controversial policies 
including importation of medicines in defiance of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and the 
legalization of same-sex marriages in Massachusetts. California elected a movie star in a gubernatorial 
recall election. U.S. Supreme Court rulings were less solicitous of state government concerns than in 
recent years. Intra-party feuding among Republicans who controlled all three branches of the national 
government ted more often to a "divided" government than to a unified majority. With tess than six 
months to the 2004 presidential election, the general public as well as political leaders formed two warring 
camps, and the principles of federalism were endangered by ideologically driven politics. 
Too often federalism is viewed solely as a constitutional-legal framework 
of jurisdictions, while its political processes are underappreciated. "The 
structure of federalism," Daniel]. Elazar explained, "is meaningful only in 
polities whose processes of government reflect federal principles." 1 These 
federalist principles include relationships of respect among people such 
that they relate to each other federally; that is, they allow for each other's 
integrity "while cooperating for the common good in every aspect of life, 
not just in the political realm."2 The balance between unity and diversity 
within a federal nation depends fundamentally on how political actors-
individuals, groups, and parties-accommodate diversity while pursuing the 
good ofall.3 In particular, the behavior of political parties affects the stability 
of federal institutions as well as their capacity to restrain conflict.4 A key 
element in james Madison's case for America's "extended republic" is that 
a large country would make it difficult, if nigh impossible, for one faction 
or political party to gain dominion over the whole country. The danger in 
'Danielj. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1987), p. 21. 
'Ibid., 70. 
'Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 2nd ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen 's University Press, 1999), 
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this design, of course, lies in the converse case. Diverse groups in a large 
nation might not agree on the common interest, and so any public action is 
seen as illegitimate. 
By President George W. Bush's third year in office, the nation was 
embroiled in three wars overseas-Afghanistan, Iraq, and the global war 
against terror-and a full-scale political war at home. The period of national 
unity forged by the terror attacks on 11 September 2001 lasted only briefly; 
less than a year later acrimony and divisiveness characterized the political 
arena. This unfortunate trend did not reverse itself; instead, it worsened 
through 2003 and into 2004. The situation deteriorated to the point of 
polarization, and many observers suggested that the nation was once again 
as divided as it was during the end days of the 2000 presidential election.5 
Easy to observe causes of this disharmony included the opening rounds 
of the 2004 presidential campaign, the missteps in the stabilization oflraq, 
the acknowledgment of intelligence failures prior to the 9/11 attacks, the 
inability to find evidence for the president's two principal reasons for 
invading Iraq, the ever larger national debt, the widespread perception 
America was losing jobs to other nations, and the discord over same-sex 
marriage. By August 2003, predictions were common that the presidential 
election in November 2004 would be "the most polarizing since the Civil 
War, and it will be the patriots versus the unpatriots."6 
Iraq War 
The swift victory over the Iraqi armed forces achieved in March and April 
2003 was replaced by a chaotic, costly, and dangerous situation that emerged 
soon after Bush declared "Mission Accomplished" on 1 May 2003. Instead 
of being welcomed as "liberators," as promised by Vice-President Dick 
Cheney, U.S. led coalition forces found themselves battling gangs oflooters, 
armed religious militia, recalcitrant Baathists, and Islamicjihadists. Whereas 
the fatalities suffered by U.S. forces during the invasion totaled 138, by 
mid-May 2004 the death toll reached 773 and the number of wounded 
exceeded 4, 700. 7 Initially budgeted at $87 billion, of which $65.6 billion 
was for military costs, the funds appropriated for Iraq by mid-May 2004 
passed $112 billion, and with requested funds, the costs of the war totaled 
at least $152 billion.8 
While controversy swirled around the rationale for regime change in 
Iraq, the rapidly inflating price tag of the war meant that pressing domestic 
problems-for example, homeland security and medical care-could not be 
addressed without adding to the national government's burgeoning debt. 
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Abuses and mismanagement by contractors not only added unnecessary 
costs, but also posed questions about the merits of "privatizing" public 
activity, especially military service. Revelations that Bush relied on faulty or 
"cooked" intelligence data fed opposition to the war at home and abroad.9 
Bush's popularity declined as military and civilian deaths rose and as Iraq 
began to look as if it could become another Vietnam quagmire. 10 The 
president retreated to the rationales that the world was safer with the 
disappearance of Saddam Hussein and that the war on terrorism could 
only be won by changing the world because "freedom is the Almighty's gift 
to every man and woman in this world. And as the greatest power on the 
face of the Earth, we have an obligation to help the spread offreedom."11 
This single-minded viewpoint served to justify any cost, and as a consequence, 
became one of the key issues in the presidential contest. 
Politics in 2003-2004 
Partisan squabbling for positional advantage in the 2004 presidential 
election dominated politics in Washington, D.C. Democrats who had 
supported Bush strongly after 9/11 felt betrayed by his unexpected attacks 
on Democratic congressional candidates in 2002. 12 Senate Republicans 
complained loudly about Democratic efforts to block the president's judicial 
nominees. Democrats in turn attacked the president for squandering 
international goodwill, mismanaging the war on terrorism, misleading the 
nation about the threat posed by Iraq (compared to other members of the 
"axis of evil"), pursuing more tax cuts while the deficit worsened, and failing 
to create more jobs. Republicans, especially the House leadership, retaliated 
by marginalizing Democrats in mark-up sessions as well as by excluding 
them from conference committees. 13 
Beginning in spring 2003 and continuing until summer 2004, public 
and private hearings held by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States ("The 9/11 Commission") produced disturbing 
information that dismayed the general public and unsettled Washington 
officialdom. The commission was a product of grass-roots action first by a 
small band of women widowed by the 9/11 attacks ("the jersey girls") and 
second by the much larger Families of September 11 organization. Fearful 
that the congressional committee investigations of the attacks would be a 
whitewash, these groups pushed for an independent commission of the 
type that investigated the Kennedy assassination. Bush opposed the creation 
of an independent commission, but once the Senate passed legislation by a 
9John Barry and Mark Hosenball, "What Went Wrong?" Newsweek, 8 February 2004, pp. 24-31. 
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90-8 vote in 2002, the White House agreed to negotiate the commission's 
scope and budget. 14 The commission's public hearings reached a climactic 
moment on 24 March 2004 when Richard Clarke, former counterterrorism 
chieffor the Bush White House, apologized to the families and to the nation 
with his opening remarks: "Those entrusted with protecting you failed 
you." 15 Clarke's testimony was followed soon by that of Condoleezza Rice, 
the National Security Advisor, who reminded the nation, "The terrorists 
were at war with us, but we were not yet at war with them. "16 Commissioners' 
questions of Rice focused on the Presidential Daily Briefing (P.D.B.) of 6 
August 2001, a pivotal document the White House had refused to release, 
but finally did so after Rice's testimony to demonstrate the validity of her 
argument that the administration never had "any actionable intelligence" 
on which to act prior to the 9/11 attacks. 17 President Bush and Vice-
President Cheney agreed to answer questions, but not under oath, and their 
interview with the commission produced "no surprises."18 
The commission's 400-page report made it clear that "the 9/11 attacks 
were a shock, but they should not have come as a surprise." After 
documenting operational errors made during the period 1998 to 2001, the 
commission proposed a three-part strategy to prevent future attacks and 
recommended several changes in the organization of intelligence agencies 
and their oversight by the president and by Congress. 19 Because the crucial 
public hearings occurred during the presidential primary season, it was 
only natural that some of the commission's findings would become elements 
in the election. In particular, the commission's announcement that there 
is "no credible evidence" that the government of Saddam Hussein 
collaborated with A1 Qaeda in its attack on the United States contradicted 
statements by Bush and Cheney.20 The declaration was part of a much 
larger indictment of "missed opportunities" by the Clinton as well as Bush 
administrations, but whether the commission's findings would hurt Bush's 
re-election was unknown. 
As is typical to the political party not holding the White House, several 
Democrats entered the primary contests, but surprisingly the field was 
reduced in short order and the party had its presumptive candidate long 
before the convention to ratify the choice. Howard Dean, former governor 
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of Vermont, attracted considerable support from those opposed to the Iraq 
war. However, Dean's acerbic style and his vulnerability on national security 
issues resulted in his withdrawal from the race as Senators john Kerry (MA) 
and John Edwards (NC) emerged from the Iowa caucuses as frontrunners. 
Kerry, a decorated Vietnam War veteran, argued his wartime experiences 
gave him the credentials to command the war on terrorism, more so than 
any other Democratic candidate. By "Super Tuesday" Kerry led Edwards in 
most state polls and garnered the necessary number of convention delegates 
to ensure his nomination.21 
Although the Democrats' nomination contest ended quickly, the charges 
leveled against Bush by the several candidates gained traction with the public 
and contributed to a decline in Bush's approval ratings. Through the last 
months of 2003 and the early part of 2004, the worsening situation in Iraq, 
the revelations about prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, and the continued bad 
news about job growth pushed the president's approval ratings to their lowest 
levels ( 43 percent) since 9/11. Although Bush's popularity plummeted 
and only 40 percent approved of his post-invasion management of Iraq, 57 
percent supported his decision to use military force to remove Saddam 
Hussein.22 Kerry contrasted his record of service in Vietnam to allegations 
that Bush did not fulfill his obligations while in the National Guard. 
Immediately after Super Tuesday, the Bush campaign initiated a national 
advertising campaign claiming Kerry had "been in Washington long enough 
to take both sides on just about every issue."23 This charge that Kerry "flip-
flopped" on issues became a constant theme of Bush's campaign. 
By June 2004, the two sides discovered most voters had already made up 
their minds as opinion polls found only 5 percent of the public undecided. 
The country's division into two polarized camps over Iraq hardened even 
more as gay rights and same-sex marriage became a cultural "wedge" issue. 
The Massachusetts Supreme judicial Court in November 2003 declared the 
state's ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional.24 In a follow-up decision 
in February 2004, the Massachusetts court ruled that civil unions are not a 
sufficient substitute for a full-fledged marriage.25 At the same time, the 
mayor of San Francisco ordered city officials to permit same-sex marriages, 
and by May 2004 gay couples obtained marriage licenses in Massachusetts.26 
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Bush endorsed a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriages, but 
while Senator Kerry opposed an amendment, he supported leaving the 
question to each state to decide. Both parties eagerly grasped this "values" 
issue as way to whip up their core supporters. As a consequence, the nation 
became more polarized. 
Economics in 2003-2004 
Depending on one's vantage point, the economy looked good or bad. 
Reports from the White House and other federal agencies documented 
the end of the recession and demonstrated brisk economic growth. Third-
quarter 2004 growth figures for Gross Domestic Product compared to the 
third quarter of 2003 were up 4. 7 percent, national income was up 5.3 
percent, and corporate profits for domestic industries were up 7. 7 percent.2' 
The 7.2 percent growth rate for the third quarter of 2004 was the highest 
quarterly rate in 21 years. 28 From a peak of 6.3 percent in June 2003, 
unemployment fell to 5.4 percent in August 2004 with nearly 1.7 million 
jobs added since August 2003. The national homeownership rate in the 
second quarter of 2004 hit an all-time high of 69.2 percent, and minority 
homeownership reached its highest point ever at 51 percent.29 All of this 
good news supported Bush's contention that his economic policies of a 
heavy reliance on tax cuts, low interest rates, and a weakening dollar were 
producing results. 
However, to many Americans, the economy did not appear so rosy. Life 
at the bottom of the economy continued to worsen as the nation experienced 
its ninth consecutive year of increase in the number of working poor who 
fell below the federal poverty line. 30 A quarter of the workforce, or about 
28 million persons between ages 18 and 64, earned less than $9.04 per 
hour, or $18,800 per year-the federal poverty line for a family of four. Sixty 
percent were white, one-fifth were foreign-born, and a majority had 
completed high school.31 The middle class, those families earning between 
$25,000 and $99,999, were not much better off as personal bankruptcies 
set a new one-year record, with job loss, divorce, or medical problems being 
the main causes. Although food and clothing consumed less of a family's 
income, housing and energy costs continued to rise, and employee benefits 
declined as employers raised employee contributions to health insurance 
by 13 percent from 2002 to 2003.32 
Factors contributing to the mixed economic picture included a rapid 
run-up in oil prices to all-time highs, thus pushing up the price of gasoline 
27U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Accounts, Table 1.15 Gross Domestic Product; 
Table 1.12 National Income by Type of Income; Table I. 16D Corporate Profits by Industry. 
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and other forms of energy. Job creation lagged far behind the growth in 
corporate income. Although the Iraq War accounted for 16 percent of the 
past year's economic growth, including a significant portion of the new 
employment, 33 total employment at the beginning of 2004 was 
approximately 3 million below that at the beginning of 2001.34 The overseas 
migration of white-collar work increased and broadened its reach beyond 
call-center operators and back-office clerks to higher skilled occupations, 
ranging from accountants, chip designers, and computer programmers to 
architecture, geographic analysis, and radiological diagnosis.35 Worker 
anxiety prompted Indiana to cancel a state contract with a consulting firm 
in India, and the likelihood of other state governments following suit grew 
as outsourcing became hotly contested.36 Labor productivity and the rising 
cost of health insurance were less widely publicized factors slowing job 
growth. Because companies could produce more goods with fewer workers, 
they had less incentive to hire, especially if workers' compensation continues 
to rise rapidly due to health care costsY 
Outsourcing and slow job creation also restrained any upward movement 
in wages; instead, many of the new jobs paid less on average than lost jobs. 
One of the most important downward pressures on wages is the "Wal-
Martization" of the economy. The country's largest retail employer pays its 
hourly workers an average of $9.64, or about one-third the pay at 
supermarkets with unionized workers. Wal-Mart's health plan also covers 
only 47 percent of its employees. As the company has expanded nationally, 
its significant advantage in wage costs (and lower prices) has driven many 
of its competitors out of business or forced them to lower wages and/or 
terminate workers.38 The lags in employment growth and wages cast doubt 
on the credibility of Bush's claim that his policies were effective, and created 
an opening for his political rivals as the quality of jobs became one of the 
key issues in the election-year debates. 
HOMElAND SECURITY 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) miSSion statement-
"to lead the unified national effort to secure America," to "prevent and 
deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards 
to the nation," to "ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful 
immigrants and visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce"--describes 
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or Dying Towns," Washington Post, II May 2004 (Netscape version). 
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in brief the department's enormous set of tasks and also hints at the obstacles 
to accomplishing those tasks. In particular, protecting the country from 
terrorism required the design and implementation of a nationwide strategy 
that functions effectively despite the high degree of governmental 
fragmentation that characterizes the American federal union. While trying 
to lead the national effort, DHS also faced more than the normal problems 
associated with the establishment of a new public agency. DHS, as the 
product of the largest reorganization within the federal government in the 
last half century, brought together approximately 180,000 employees from 
22 existing agencies. Unifying these disparate entities into an effective force 
posed a huge challenge. The immediacy of threats made rapid progress 
essential, but the realities of government and politics could not be avoided. 
By the end of its first year, DHS leaders could point to several important 
accomplishments while critics could point to several crucial shortcomings. 
Secretary Tom Ridge, speaking to the National Association of Counties 
on DHS' first anniversary, highlighted activities he claimed made America 
"more secure and better prepared ... than we were a year ago." Ridge 
enumerated several successes, including significant advances in air travel 
security, new layers of custom and border protection, overseas inspection 
of U.S.-bound cargo, stockpiles of antibiotics and vaccines, and new 
standards for first-responder personal protective equipment. He also 
announced the inauguration of the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS), "the nation's first-ever standardized management system, a 
framework to create a unified command system for federal, state and local 
governments and the response community."39 NIMS establishes "a single, 
unified standard that could be applied to any crisis, no matter how large or 
how localized" creating a "common set of terminologies, protocols and 
processes to ensure a seamless, coordinated response" to terrorist 
incidents.40 Ridge asserted that NIMS and other new activities and tools 
such as the planned Homeland Security Information Network and the 
National Infrastructure Coordination Center, and Unified National Database 
of Critical Infrastructure "required a whole new philosophy ofhowwe secure 
the country, a philosophy of shared responsibility, shared accountability 
and shared leadership-in short, a renewed commitment to federalism."41 
To be sure, the shock of9/ll prompted all governments to increase their 
degree of interaction, but "a philosophy of shared responsibility" is hardly 
a new notion in emergency response and disaster management nor is it a 
new philosophy in the implementation of many domestic policies.42 
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These impressive accomplishments notwithstanding, the 
institutionalization of new homeland security initiatives encountered several 
implementation obstacles. In the department's first six months, two of 
Secretary Ridge's principal assistants resigned following criticism from the 
White House, and many federal employees who were scheduled to be 
transferred to the new department decided not to accept transfer. What 
appeared initially to be a generous budget quickly disappeared as the cost 
of overtime for airport screeners depleted appropriated funds. Ridge 
offended officials in the Secret Service (now transferred to DHS) by an 
agreement to permit the Department of justice (DOJ) to become the lead 
agency for investigations of terrorism financing, thus forcing the Secret 
Service to halt hundreds of its own ongoing cases and end its traditional 
responsibility in this area. Furthermore, DHS found itself in competition 
with Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS), and even the White House's Homeland Security Council.43 
Serious criticism continued through DHS' first year. Many of the actions 
taken by the Transportation Security Agency (TSA)-for example, air 
marshals and lists of items prohibited on board airplanes-were labeled as 
"cosmetic" because TSA used outmoded 1970s screening equipment, 
luggage and air cargo were not screened, and aircraft remained vulnerable 
to shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. Wags went so far as refer to TSA as 
"thousands standing around."44 The Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) reported that information on the state of the nation's public safety 
wireless communication network was unavailable, and thus efforts to improve 
interoperability were impeded. 45 The GAO also criticized DHS for 
"continuing confusion" among federal, state and local officials caused by 
its color-coded threat alert system. A GAO survey of 84 agencies and 
jurisdictions found the vagueness of the system's warnings had "hindered 
their (the respondents') ability to determine whether they were at risk" 
and "what protective measures to take in response."46 Members of both 
parties in Congress worried that "the public was at risk for 'threat fatigue'," 
and that "the public's going to lose trust and confidence in the system and 
won't pay any attention to it anymore."47 
Despite Ridge's declarations of "shared responsibility" for homeland 
security, serious problems plagued intergovernmental implementation. An 
August 2003 survey of cities conducted by the U.S. Conference of Mayors 
(USCM) showed that 90 percent of the responding cities had not received 
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any money from the $1.5 billion federal funds to prepare local responders 
for terrorist incidents. James A. Garner, the Republican mayor of 
Hempstead, New York, and president of the USCM, stated: "Nine-one-one 
does not ring at the statehouse; it rings in city hall. Cities are the first to 
respond in a crisis, but the last in line for funds. We need direct funds."48 
The targets of the mayors' complaints were state governments as much as 
the federal government. Tom Cochran, executive director of the USCM, 
expressed the view that the mayors believed "state decision makers tend to 
view counties, rather than cities, as the focal points of emergency and disaster 
response." Christine M. LaPaille, a spokesperson for the National 
Governors' Association (NGA), rejected the mayors' criticisms of state 
government by noting: "States are the only players sitting at the homeland 
security table that are in a position to take the lead in formulating regional 
strategic plans that protect our communities."49 This state, county, municipal 
bickering is reminiscent of the 1960s and 1970s when county sheriffs and 
city police feuded over law-enforcement assistance grants. At stake in this 
intergovernmental fight is the disposition of monies from programs such 
as the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) and the Emergency 
Management Performance Grant (EMPG). 
The intrastate squabbles have been paralleled by interstate arguments 
over the geographic distribution of federal aid. For example, the EMPG 
formula awards 0. 75 percent of the $2 billion appropriation to each state 
regardless of the state's population; the rest is then distributed on a per 
capita basis. Because factors such as population density, potential targets, 
and threat levels are not part of the aid formula, Wyoming (the least 
populous state) in 2003 received $35.31 per person, while California received 
$4.68 and New York $5.05 per person.50 New York City Mayor Bloomberg 
called this distribution "pork barrel politics at its worst," but Larry Majerus, 
deputy director of the Wyoming Office of Homeland Security, pointedly 
observed that: "If we understand anything about the psychology of terrorism, 
it is that attacks in the future are likely to be multiple and designed to get 
the biggest psychological effect they can possibly get. One way to do that is 
to attack in areas where there is the least capacity to respond."51 To be 
sure, there are other less well funded grants targeted to large cities, for 
example, $65 million for transit security, $800 million for 30 cities judged 
to be high threat locations, and $245 million for port security, but these 
funds do not begin to provide the dollars necessary to fully protect the 
nation's metropolitan areas.52 The emergence of these intergovernmental 
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battles over grant monies, of course, is not unexpected, given the long history 
of such fiscal fights in American federalism. 
The problems associated with the timely delivery of homeland security 
funds were investigated by an intergovernmental task force established by 
Secretary Ridge, and the Report from the Task Force on State and Local Homeland 
Security Funding, issued in June 2004, found that ( 1) ordinary procurement 
and cash-management procedures cannot be relied on in extraordinary 
times because ordinary state and local buying rules at times conflict with 
the need for rapid procurement, (2) the reimbursement requirement of 
the 1990 Cash Management Act created problems for many cash-strapped 
municipalities, (3) many state and local governments lack the purchasing 
power to obtain goods and services in a timely fashion, ( 4) a lack of national 
standards guiding distribution, tracking, and oversight of homeland security 
funds delays disbursement, (5) while long-term operational plans are 
important to develop, urgent needs such as risk-based funding and overtime 
reimbursement must be addressed now, (6) state and local governments 
are often overwhelmed and understaffed to cope with the complex grant 
system, (7) communication gaps exist at all levels of government, (8) local 
jurisdictions may have unrealistic expectations given the limited amount of 
funding available, so expectations have to be managed, and (9) unavoidable 
equipment backlogs and vendor delays have slowed the process. 53 The task 
force made eleven recommendations, among which were ( 1) exempt for 
FY2005 Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) homeland security grants 
from the 1990 Cash Management Act, (2) encourage state and local 
governments to alter legislative and procurement procedures to expedite 
the expenditure of homeland security monies, (3) establish multi-state 
cooperative purchasing consortia, ( 4) enhance the training of state and 
local officials involved in the management of security-related grants, (5) 
establish an Office of the Comptroller within DHS to assume complete 
responsibility over grant programs, and (6) establish a comprehensive risk-
assessment methodology to support identification of high-risk, high-
consequence critical infrastructure and m~or events, and allow grant funds, 
distributed through states, to be used to directly offset the costs incurred by 
state, county, municipal, and tribal entities for securing those critical 
infrastructure and major events identified as high risk by DHS.54 
Similar issues of disbursement affected DHHS grants for bioterrorism 
preparedness. Between 11 September 2001 and June 2004, the Health 
Resources Services Agency (HRSA) spent more than $3.7 billion on the 
nation's public health infrastructure, including in FY 2004 nearly $850 
million to states (as well as New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, and the 
District of Columbia) as part of the Public Health Preparedness and 
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Response Cooperative Agreement program. 55 Yet with all of this effort, 
critics in Congress complained to DHHS Secretary Tommy Thompson that 
the National Preparedness Plan "is merely a listing of bioterrorism related 
activities" underway, and that "public health laboratories are poorly 
equipped, mandatory progress reports have not been filed, hospitals do 
not have the beds or equipment to handle mass casualties" leaving "America 
still too vulnerable to a possible bioterror attack."56 Secretary Thompson 
replied to critics by pointing out "the states have not spent almost half of 
the $3.7 billion in current grants," and so he was shifting money away from 
states back to federal programs. Patrick Libbey, a spokesperson for the 
National Association of County and City Health Officials, deemed 
Thompson's remarks as "misinformation" because "92 percent of the grant 
money has been obligated by the states, which in many cases are simply 
waiting to receive bills."57 Again, the quarrels over bioterrorism grants mimic 
those over other homeland security grants. It should also be noted that the 
problems identified in these disputes were predicted soon after 9/11 by 
experts within government58 and by experts outside of government. 59 
Homeland Security and Civil Liberties 
The USA Patriot Act continues to attract opposition. For example, Laura 
W. Murphy, director of the Washington office of the Americans for Civil 
Liberties Union, declared, "there is a growing sense among regular 
Americans of all political stripes-from the most right-wing to the most left-
that the Patriot Act went too far, too fast."60 In August 2003, the U.S. House 
of Representatives with its Republican majority surprised the Bush 
administration by opposing funding for the act's "sneak and peek" warrants, 
but the effort failed. At the same time, the number of local governments 
that passed resolutions denouncing parts or all of the Patriot Act grew to 
more than 150.61 
Through much of the year, Attorney General John Ashcroft stepped 
forward on a frequent basis to make public pleas in support of the act. The 
Patriot Act became a political football as Democrats campaigning for the 
presidency criticized Ashcroft's intermittent raising and lowering of 
terrorism alerts. Even many in the intelligence community expressed doubts 
that the attorney general's declarations that AI Qaeda was "almost ready to 
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attack the United States" were based on new and solid intelligence. Some 
persons such as Harold Schaitberger, chief of the International Association 
of Fire Fighters, suggested that the terror alerts were raised in a "politically 
convenient" fashion after "we see the president's approval ratings 
plummet."62 By June 2004, homeland security had become a highly 
politicized issue, and public opinion polls found the nation equally divided 
as to whether President Bush or Senator Kerry could be trusted to do a 
better job of handling the war on terrorism. Secretary Ridge often expressed 
opinions that differed from Attorney General Ashcroft's views about how 
imminent were any threats.63 
A bipartisan coalition in the House kept trying to muster a majority in 
support of various measures to trim back the Patriot Act. None of their 
attempts succeeded, but in early summer 2004 a proposal to block the act's 
section permitting the government to investigate the reading habits of 
citizens came very close. Only heavy lobbying by the White House and the 
threat of a presidential veto managed to create a 210-210 tie that prevented 
the amendment's adoption. 64 In mid:July, Ashcroft released another 
detailed report in defense of the Patriot Act. The report noted 310 persons 
had been charged under the act and 179 had been convicted or had pled 
guilty. Furthermore, the attorney general pointed out the act permitted 
the DOJ to pursue more traditional criminal investigations using the 
department's expanded powers. This revelation prompted another round 
of bipartisan complaints about the misuse of the act and the attorney 
general's willingness to extend the act to non-terrorism cases.65 
The 9/11 Commission 
Much of the 9/11 Commission's report focused on the national 
government and its relationship to terrorism's international environment. 
However, as part of its attempt to answer questions about the failure of 
American government to anticipate and prevent the 9/11 and other terrorist 
incidents, the commission did offer a few observations and 
recommendations relevant to the federal character of American 
government. The commission, while applauding the bravery of first-
responders, did note that the rescue efforts of police, fire, and emergency 
management personnel in New York City were "hampered by problems in 
command and control and in internal communications."66 The commission 
also highlighted the failure to share information among agencies involved 
in homeland security as well as the failure of these agencies to engage in 
joint planning. Key recommendations related to intergovernmental 
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relations include (a) establish an information system of "need to share" to 
replace the current system of "need to know," (b) create a National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to serve as a national clearinghouse of 
information and knowledge related to homeland security and to engage in 
joint operational planning, implementation, and tracking of homeland 
security activities, (c) "make homeland security funding contingent on the 
adoption of an incident command system to strengthen teamwork in a crisis, 
including a regional approach," and (d) "base federal funding for 
emergency preparedness solely on risks and vulnerabilities, putting New 
York City and Washington, D.C., at the top ofthe current list. Such assistance 
should not remain a program for general revenue sharing or pork-barrel 
spending." Unfortunately, as mentioned previously, homeland security grant 
programs already exhibit features the commission warned against. 
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLICY MIX 
The overarching fact facing policymakers at all levels of government was 
the decline of total government revenues to 27 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP), their lowest level since 1968. Federal revenues as a share 
of GDP dropped to levels not seen since 1959, and in particular, the federal 
income tax (personal and corporate) plummeted to levels equivalent to 
1942! State and local revenues equaled 10.6 percent of GDP. Despite the 
efforts of 30 states to increase taxes, state and local revenues were below 
those in 1988. Overall public spending was restrained, remaining lower 
than any year from 1980 to 1996. The culprit in the overall revenue shortfall 
was the federal income tax; in particular, three years of tax cuts reduced 
federal revenues by $172 billion in 2003. Put another way, had the tax cuts 
not been enacted, federal income-tax revenues would have constituted 10.1 
percentofGDP in 2003, instead of8.5 percent.67 From FY2002 to FY2003, 
corporate taxes fell by 11.1 percent, to 1.2 percent of GDP-the lowest level 
since 1983-and declined by nearly 29 percent since FY 2000. Individual 
income taxes in one year fell 7.5 percent and are 21 percent less than in FY 
2000. Only Social Security and Medicare revenues continued to show 
growth, which means the federal government depends heavily on regressive 
taxes and borrowed funds. 68 
The collapse of federal income taxes consumed the surpluses built up 
between FY 1998 and FY 2001 and altered the national government's ledger 
from the FY 2001 $127 billion surplus to a $158 biilion deficit in FY 2002 
and a $401 billion deficit in FY2003.69 In FY 2001, the Congressional Budget 
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Office (CBO) projected a $5.6 trillion surplus for the decade from FY 2002 
to FY 2011, but as of August 2003, CBO projected a "best case" $2.3 trillion 
cumulative deficit by FY 2011. The $8 trillion swing is equivalent to "the 
total revenue collected by the United States government from 1789 to 
1983."70 This fiscal outlook compelled the International Monetary Fund 
to issue a warning that the rapid rise in U.S. government debt posed a threat 
to the global economy.n 
Multiple causes account for the deficit. No doubt the economic slowdown 
beginning in 2001 and lasting into 2003 undercut the fiscal base of all 
governments. But with the economy accelerating from 2003 to 2004, the 
long-term drivers of the deficit are military-related spending for fighting 
three wars simultaneously and three years of tax cuts. Military spending for 
FY 2003 devoured $389 billion, a 17.2 percent increase in one year, and 
since FY 2001 military spending has increased by 34 percent. This FY 2003 
rate of growth was far above the average 7 percent growth in spending on 
non-defense programs. By comparison, Medicare and Medicaid grew by 
8.4 percent in FY 2003.72 
These figures ring fire alarms for fiscal conservatives. The libertarian Cato 
Institute issued an analysis showing the Bush administration raised military 
spending 27 percent in real terms, and that figure did not include the $87 
billion supplemental appropriation for Iraq. Perhaps more frustrating for 
fiscal hawks, the Cato study also showed that non-military discretionary spend-
ing rose by 21 percent. Of course, homeland security accounts for some of 
the rise in discretionary spending, but Cato wrung its hands over Bush's un-
willingness to veto appropriation acts loaded with pork-barrel projects. 73 
Frustration with Bush and with his colleagues in Congress prompted Sena-
tor John McCain (R-AZ) to declare, "The president cannot say, as he has 
many times, that 'I'm going to enforce some spending discipline' and then 
not veto bills. Congress is now spending money like a drunken sailor."74 
The three years of tax cuts, justified originally as the simple return of 
taxpayers' money that had resulted in a surplus, but then as necessary to re-
start the stalled economy, were designed so that the stimulative effect would 
be at its peak in the period between the summer of 2003 and the summer of 
2004. During FY 2003, individual taxpayers (not companies) received $117 
billion in rebates and reductions in tax rates on wages and salaries. Another 
$83 billion was scheduled to be doled out during FY 2004. Unless these tax 
breaks are made permanent, the stimulus begins to shrink in FY 2005.75 
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Deficit worries collided with the electoral politics of stimulative tax cuts 
in March 2004 when four moderate Republican senators-Lincoln Chaffee 
(RI),John McCain (AZ), Susan Collins (ME), and Olympia Snowe (ME)-
voted with Democrats to support a new rule requiring a supermajority of 60 
votes to approve any tax cuts in the next five years.76 This action not only 
was a setback for Bush's effort to make the tax cuts permanent-a key piece 
of the president's campaign platform-but it also pitted the Senate against 
the House of Representatives where the leadership opposed the so-called 
"pay-as-you-go" (or "pay-go") rule. Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-TX) 
explained, "We, as a matter of philosophy, understand that when you cut 
taxes the economy grows, and revenues to the government grow. The whole 
notion that you have to cut spending in order to cut taxes negates that 
philosophy, and so I'm not interested in something that would negate our 
philosophy. "77 Instead of philosophy, it required power politics for the 
House leadership to stop a proposal by some in their own party to have the 
House adopt the Senate's "pay-go" rule. During the roll-call, 212 members 
had voted aye, but after lobbying by Bush and House leaders, the final count 
was 209-209, thus defeating the measure.78 The rift over "pay-go" continued 
into early summer as efforts failed to pass a budget that by June 2004 was 
eight months late. Senator McCain, responding to pressure from House 
Republicans, justified the "pay-go" stance by scolding "fat cats" who were 
not willing to make sacrifices while the nation was fighting a war. He also 
"fondly remember[ed] a time when real Republicans stood for fiscal 
responsibility. Apparently, those days are long gone for some of those in 
our party."79 
More Tax Cuts 
A decision by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 had ruled 
as illegal the 15 percent of net export income American exporters were 
permitted to exempt from their taxation. The WTO had set 31 December 
2003 as the deadline to eliminate this provision from the U.S. tax code. 
The repeal of the provision would eliminate $5 billion in subsidies to 
American companies, and many domestic manufacturers, who had seen 
their profits and payrolls decline, were not about to accept an increase in 
taxation. Numerous companies banded together to support a lobbying 
campaign for a new set of corporate tax breaks to offset the loss of the tax 
export subsidy. The necessity to change the tax code opened the door to a 
"gold rush" for all manner of tax breaks reminiscent of the 1986 "Cucci 
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Gulch" phenomenon.80 In mid-May 2004, the Senate passed on a 92-5 vote 
a bill to give $170 billion in new tax concessions to business while closing 
some tax shelters.81 But campaign politics interfered with the bill's approval 
by the House when Bush commented that he opposed a multi-billion dollar 
buyout of tobacco growers that was tied to acceptance of the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration's regulation of cigarette manufacturing. This surprise 
statement infuriated farmers in North Carolina, Kentucky, and Tennessee, 
generally Republican states with electoral college votes that would be 
valuable in the 2004 election.82 Inability to resolve the issue of the tobacco 
buyout kept the corporate tax package bogged down into mid-summer 2004. 
Another roadblock to change in the tax code was bipartisan opposition 
from the National Governors' Association (NGA) of a House proposal to 
impose a federal limit on the ability of state governments to tax business 
activity within a state's borders. State business-activity taxes (BATs) totaled 
more than $30 billion in annual state revenue, and governors were loath to 
lose any revenues during the on-going state fiscal crisis. NGA testimony 
argued that limits on state BATs would undermine a basic principle of 
federalism-that state governments may determine their tax policy 
independently of the national government. The governors stated the House 
proposal, if adopted, would put Congress in the position of writing state tax 
laws and thus overturn 225 years of federalism practice.83 
The deep divisions within Republican legislative ranks bordered on 
political embarrassment for the party, which controlled both chambers. 
Republican leadership was unable to gain sufficient support to pass the 
long overdue budget bill, to resolve the "pay-go" debate, or to enact the 
large package of corporate tax-breaks. What was at stake for many inside 
the party was the very future of the party itself. For those philosophically 
attached to tax cuts, adoption of the "pay-as-you-go" rule would result in all 
of the $1.7 trillion in tax reduction over ten years expiring by 2011, much 
of it sooner, and that meant tax levels would return to higher levels that 
existed during the Clinton years. Those who supported "pay-go" argued 
"the deficit is a symptom; spending is the disease ... And we have to do 
something about the disease." But even the "pay-as-you-go" position, if 
adopted, would not fully solve the deficit because even if Congress eliminated 
all domestic discretionary spending (including homeland security), that 
would yield only $438 billion in FY 2004. Since the CBO's mid-summer 
estimate of the deficit was $455 billion, the government would still be in 
debt. With neither side willing to compromise, the situation was best 
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captured by a long-time proponent of fiscal restraint, former Senator Warren 
B. Rudman (R-NH) who wryly observed that "for a majority of Republicans 
in Congress, tax cuts are now more important than budget constraints, and 
they've gotten themselves between a rock and a hard place." Given these 
polarized positions, it is little wonder that there were no budget negotiations 
for all of June 2004, nor were any planned for July.84 
Health Care 
The cost of health care continued its unrelenting annual rise as evidenced 
by the 13.9 increase in the price of health insurance.85 In 2000, the average 
health insurance premium for employer-provided coverage was $6,438 
($4,819 employer contribution and $1,619 employee contribution); by2003, 
the average premium rose to $9,068 ($6,656 employer contribution and 
$2,412 employee contribution) .86 With unemployment also rising coupled 
with an increase in the number of employers cutting employer-provided 
health coverage, the number of persons without health insurance, according 
to U.S. Census Bureau figures, jumped to 43.6 million (15.2 percent of the 
population). However, a study conducted by the Lewin Group for Families 
USA found that the number of persons without health insurance was 81.8 
million, or 32 percent of Americans younger than 65. The study estimated 
that "one in three Americans younger than 65 were uninsured for a time 
during 2002 and 2003 ... half were uninsured for at least nine months, and 
two-thirds for at least six months."87 The upward ascent of costs combined 
with the decline in employer-provided coverage make health insurance a 
luxury even for middle-class families. The percentage of families in the 
$25,000 to $49,999 annual income bracket without health insurance 
increased from 17.3 in 2001 to 19.3 in 2002, with the 2002 percentages for 
black and Hispanic families at 79.8 and 81.6 respectively.88 
The Government Accountability Office identified several pressures 
contributing to the upward march of health care costs: (1) the nation's 
wealth, (2) the pluralistic organization of the U.S. health care system, (3) 
unwarranted variation in medical practices, and (4) ambivalent attitudes 
toward rationing health care.89 Harvard University and the Canadian 
Institute for Health Information studied administrative costs in both 
countries and discovered that in 1987 U.S. per capita administrative costs 
were $450-three times higher than in Canada. By 1999 (the last year for 
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available data), the U.S. per capita cost was $1,059 compared to $307 for 
Canada. The research report pointed to three factors that accounted for 
the U.S.-Canadian cost differential: (1) private insurers' high overhead, (2) 
multiplicity of payment forms and rules used by U.S. hospitals and other 
health providers, and (3) an expanded bureaucracy associated with 
American hospitals and private insurers. Overall, 31 percent of U.S. health-
care monies went to administrative costs.90 This continuing stream of bad 
news about health care and the pressures generated by calls for reform 
made the final negotiations on Medicare modernization highly contentious. 
The june 2003 compromise to provide equal prescription drug benefits 
for persons in traditional Medicare and in market-based health plans led to 
the passage of companion but not identical bills in the House and Senate. 
Numerous differences still had to be resolved, especially the fiscal structure 
of the drug benefit and the subsidization of private health-care plans. The 
conference committee remained deadlocked through the summer and far 
into the fall as a chasm opened between conservative Republicans in the 
House and Senate. The House faction issued a manifesto in mid-September 
laying out four conditions for their approval of a Medicare prescription 
drug bill: (1) "no price controls can be imposed on the drug industry," (2) 
"the government must offer new tax incentives for people to establish savings 
accounts from which to pay their medical costs," (3) "the fee-for-service 
Medicare program must compete directly with private health plans, as 
envisioned in the House bill," and ( 4) "the cost of drug benefits must not 
exceed $400 billion over 10 years."91 By contrast, Senate Republicans, while 
supportive of more competition in the private health market, insisted private 
plans needed significant strengthening, in the form of billions of dollars, 
before competition would be effective. Their chief concern was that 
traditional Medicare would eliminate competitors in some parts of the 
country, if private providers were not propped up until they could attract a 
sufficient base of participants.92 To bolster market competition, House 
conferees pushed a "premium support" proposal in which beneficiaries 
would receive a subsidy to help them purchase private health insurance. 
This idea was denounced by critics who claimed it "could leave Medicare 
with the sickest and poorest patients, driving up premiums and undermining 
the program."93 Senate Democrats and moderate Republican senators 
pushed the Senate bill's reliance on a government-run "fallback" system to 
guarantee prescription-drug benefits in areas where only one or no private 
plan functioned; the House bill did not include such a backup plan.94 
Congressional leaders had set 17 October 2003 as the deadline for the 
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conference committee to complete its work, but these hardened positions 
made it unlikely that date would be met. 
At the same time, other contentious issues contributed to the stalemate 
within the conference committee. Some conferees advocated reinstating 
the co-payment for home health care that had been eliminated in 1972. 
The co-payment was dropped 30 years ago to create an incentive to 
encourage home care as an alternative to more costly nursing home care, 
but now its reimposition was pushed as an incentive use home health care 
more prudently. Both home care agencies and senior citizen interest groups 
condemned the co-payment as a "sick tax" falling especially hard on elderly, 
low-income women.95 Another cost-control measure debated fiercely within 
the conference committee was the controversial old idea of a "means test" 
for physician and other outpatient care by which wealthier seniors would 
pay more for these services than the less affluent. Although there was 
bipartisan senatorial support for a higher part B Medicare premium for the 
two percent of Medicare patients with incomes above $100,000, Senator 
Edward Kennedy (D-MA) threatened to filibuster any bill containing a means 
test.96 A third issue arose over the concern that not counting employer 
contributions toward the out-of-pocket cap on pharmaceutical costs to 
seniors would ignite a "war between seniors" who have drug benefits 
provided through employer-funded retiree plans and those who do not. As 
prices for medicine have increased, employer coverage of retiree health 
plans has declined. Seniors not on an employer plan would pay a maximum 
of $5,800 compared to $10,000 for seniors on an employer plan (split 
between the employer and the retiree). Critics noted this difference would 
accelerate the demise of employer coverage of retirees with the government 
forced to cover the additional costs.97 
Ultimately, it was the issue of competition in the form of premium 
supports that was the sticking point within the conference committee. 
Democrats opposed competition with private plans because they believed 
it would undercut the traditional Medicare program. They also objected to 
limits on Medicare spending for new drug benefits and wanted increased 
incentives for employers to maintain drug benefits for retirees. Conservative 
Republicans demanded competition between Medicare and private plans 
be fostered because they saw competition as a means to control costs. Both 
parties accepted a prescription-drug benefit, but premium support was the 
partisan "fault line."98 The breakthrough came with a proposal crafted by 
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Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN) and House Speaker J. Dennis 
Hastert (R-IL) to test competition in four metropolitan areas and one region 
of the country, but not until 2008. This proposed "demonstration project" 
was an effort by the Republican leadership to appease the pro-competition 
faction in the House which had stood their ground against party leaders 
and the president. In an extraordinary session where the vote was held 
open three hours instead of the more typical twenty minutes, the House 
passed the Medicare bill on a vote of 220 to 215. It should be noted that 
through much of the evening the roll call stood at 216 yea to 218 nay. The 
Speaker and Tommy Thompson, secretary of Health and Human Services, 
button holed Republican representatives on the floor, and eventually a few 
more Republicans switched their votes. Democrats branded the vote as 
"Florida style" politics.99 The next day, several Senate Democrats announced 
they would vote for the bill passed by the House. Lacking enough votes to 
sustain a filibuster, other Senate Democrats could do little but cast "no" 
votes as the Senate adopted the Medicare bill by a 54 to 44 vote on 25 
November 2003. 100 On 8 December 2003, the president signed the Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003. 
State governments had a large stake in the passage of Medicare legislation 
because many states, acting as laboratories of democracy, had established 
pharmaceutical assistance programs. Some of these programs had more 
liberal eligibility requirements and/ or benefits more generous than those 
contained in the new Medicare legislation. But as Steven]. Rausch en berger, 
the assistant Republican leader of the Illinois Senate, noted: "Instead of 
emphasizing the good work being done by states and encouraging states to 
continue, the federal government came up with a one-size fits all Potomac 
solution."101 Especially troublesome were coordination issues between the 
state and federal plans including which drugs were covered under which 
plan and how much would a senior pay for a prescription under each plan. 
Where states provided benefits superior to those in the federal plan such as 
in New York and Wisconsin, there was resistance to move seniors to the 
inferior program. 102 A critical issue to watch will be whether states continue 
their pharmaceutical assistance programs as supplements to the federal 
benefit or whether they begin to terminate their programs. 
Meanwhile, the initial implementation of the new Medicare discount 
drug cards did take some of the luster off the benefit's political value. 
Because the full prescription-drug benefit will not go into effect until 2006, 
the act provides some immediate relief from the high costs of medicine by 
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creating federal drug-discount cards to be offered to citizens through a 
partnership between HMOs and prescription drug manufacturers. 
Enrollment fees were set at a maximum of$30, and discounts were expected 
to range from 10 to 25 percent on prescriptions. This stopgap measure 
immediately resulted in massive confusion among seniors as 73 sponsors 
offered competing cards, each with their own combination of approved 
drugs, fees, savings, and affiliated pharmacies. Adding to the confusion, 
the federal drug-discount card competed with 11 existing state drug-discount 
programs as well as eight state programs that had been approved but were 
not yet fully operational. 103 
The high profile political battle over Medicare overshadowed the growing 
intergovernmental conflicts over Medicaid. As the state fiscal crisis 
continued into its fourth year, no end appeared to be in sight for the 
explosive growth in Medicaid costs. Rising unemployment made the 
increasing number of eligibles the fastest growing cost factor for 20 states, 
while prescription drug costs constituted the largest cost factor in 16 states. 104 
Nearly every state took some form of action to cut its Medicaid costs, and 
many states shifted these costs to the federal government. (It is important 
to remember federal and state governments split the costs of Medicaid.) 
The National Conference of State Legislatures advised members on how to 
maximize the use of federal Medicaid dollars, but federal officials viewed 
these efforts as inappropriate accounting tricks undermining the fiscal 
integrity of Medicaid. Dennis Smith, director of the Center for Medicaid 
and State Operations in the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS), declared the states were using "complex, creative financing schemes 
... to shift a larger portion of Medicaid costs to the federal government." 105 
This cost shifting was possible because numerous states had discovered what 
has been labeled as the "intergovernmental loophole" by which states could 
bill the federal government at the highest rate allowed but then choose to 
reimburse nursing homes at lower rates. This loophole has been used by 
20 states and has allowed them to yield a net gain of hundreds of millions 
of additional federal funds over the last decade. 106 To close this 
intergovernmental loophole, CMS in Februrary 2004 published draft 
regulations to make states provide details of"each source of revenue" used 
to pay for the state share of Medicaid costs. State Medicaid budgets would 
be subject to federal approval if the proposed rules were adopted. 
Opposition by state officials was predictable. Mary B. Kennedy, Minnesota's 
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Medicaid director, observed: "Federal officials see themselves as having prior 
approval over state budgets. State legislators do not see that as a proper 
role."107 Bipartisan resistance from the NGA forced the secretary of Health 
and Human Services, Tommy Thompson, to backtrack and "enter into 
consultations on the proposal with the states through the NGA and the 
National Association of State Medicaid Directors."108 
The federal-state feud over the importation of prescription drugs from 
Canada grew increasingly acrimonious and demonstrated the ability of state 
governments to defy Washington. In just three years, the importation of 
pharmaceutical drugs from Canada rose from a modest few million dollars 
to about $800 million. Senior citizens burdened by spiraling prices for 
medicines took the initiative to buy drugs from Canada where the prices 
are approximately 50 percent lower than in the United States. Governors 
and legislatures in states such as Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Rhode Island, and Vermont have turned to Canada and established various 
drug-importation programs. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
and the White House have vigorously opposed these actions, but in Congress 
a "politics makes strange bedfellows" coalition of 155 Democrats and 87 
Republicans passed legislation making it legal to import drugs from Canada 
and 24 other nations. 109 This coalition managed to inject the issue of drug 
importation into the negotiations over the Medicare Modernization Act. 
Publicly, the administration and congressional leaders argued against 
importation because of the dangers of unsafe medicines. In the United 
States, 50 different sets of state regulations as well as federal regulations 
result in a not well policed "shadow market" of drug diverters in which it is 
easier to gain a license to buy and sell drugs than it is to become a 
beautician. 110 Nevertheless, the administration's opposition was tied closely 
to the drug industry's campaign contributions to Republicans- $22 million 
in 2002, or three-fourths of all their contributions. 111 Ultimately, drug 
importation was defeated and not included in the final provisions signed 
into law. 
But the issue refused to die. Cities and states defied federal law by moving 
forward with drug importation programs. In April 2004 while the Senate 
appeared close to working out the details of legislation to permit drug 
importation, CMS approved plans by Alaska, Michigan, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, and Vermont to establish a purchasing pool to seek lower prices 
on prescription drugs for Medicaid patients. Governor Craig Benson (R-
NH) noted, "Minnesota, Hawaii, and Tennessee intend to join the pool, 
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with more states likely to follow." 112 CMS opened a website designed to 
help citizens compare drug prices among retailers that accept the new 
Medicare drug-discount cards. 113 With prices unchecked-the AARP found 
the average price increase over the last four years to be 27.6 percent-and 
legislation stalled in Congress, state and local governments continued to 
break the law (at least in the eyes of the FDA) and develop various 
importation programs. Grassroots actions have had a strong effect on many 
states and localities, but have yet to alter federal policy; whether the pressure 
of seniors can overcome the influence of the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America remains to be seen. 
Welfare 
Two years after it was scheduled for reauthorization, the 1996 Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) 
remained stranded in legislative limbo. Its inability to adopt a budget forced 
Congress to extend the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
block grant program through 30 June 2004. By mid-summer 2004, the House 
agreed to a further extension until 31 March 2005, but the Senate had yet to 
concur. From a larger perspective, the Bush administration did not see welfare 
reform as an important issue area, one that needed to be addressed prior to 
the upcoming presidential election campaign. Bush's last speech on welfare 
reform was delivered on 24 February 2003, and the White House web page 
had not updated material on welfare reform since that date. 
Energy 
A blackout in August 2004 demonstrated the fragility of the nation's 
electricity grid, and prices for petroleum products moved upward through 
the year. Yet, little movement occurred to make changes in U.S. energy 
policy. Bills in the House and Senate did not share a common strategy for 
addressing energy problems, rather the one shared attribute was pork. 
Instead of bold policy, Congress preferred a list of tax incentives for interest 
groups, including $11 billion for the oil and gas industry, $2.5 billion in 
production credits for clean coal technology, $2 billion for alternative motor 
vehicles, and about $2 billion in tax breaks for the electric power industry. 114 
The congressional preference for tax breaks received support from Bush 
who opposed conservation efforts via a new energy tax or higher mileage 
standards for vehicles. Instead, the administration supported targeting tax 
incentives to traditional energy industry groups located primarily in the 
South and other solidly Republican states. 115 
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Congressional inability to produce an energy bill that could address the 
nation's long-term energy needs was mirrored by the lack of agreement on 
energy policy among the nation's governors. After the August 2004 blackout, 
NGA lobbied Washington to pursue a more conservation-oriented policy 
and to foster federal-state cooperation in the development and integration 
of the nation's electricity infrastructure. 116 But NGA is itself divided by the 
conflicting interests of the 50 states that make consensus on a unified strategy 
difficult to attain. The NGA's policy positions on energy emphasize the 
traditional authority of states over economic development and land use, 
and as would be expected, NGA opposes efforts by the federal government 
to preempt state prerogatives.117 
Era of Big Government Returns? 
President Ronald Reagan sought to curb the size and influence of the 
federal government; so did Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich. President 
Bill Clinton famously declared the era of big government was over. But the 
enactment of major new public programs, often with substantial price tags, 
in the first three years of the Bush presidency raises the question: has the 
era of "big government" returned? Bush has pushed hard for expensive 
programs such as the No Child Left Behind Act and the Medicare 
prescription drug benefit. He has pursued a steady policy of tax 
expenditures, in particular, by reducing taxation on capital accumulation. 
He has not stood in the way oflarge subsidies to farm interests and has not 
opposed the expansion of earmarked funds for pork-barrel projects. 118 
Further, the combination of tax cuts and increased spending has consumed 
the surplus funds that were on the federal government's ledger at the start 
of his term, and yet the president has shown little interest in stopping the 
slide into deep debt. It is little wonder that many conservative groups find 
this record "appalling" and a "disaster." 119 The level offederal activism and 
the preference for centralized approaches exhibited by the Bush 
administration reverse the course charted by recent Republican 
administrations. Bush's policies abandon the Reagan and Gingrich efforts 
to shrink government. Instead, Bush aggressively uses government to weaken 
the opposition and build his electoral base. 120 Whether the first three years 
of policy choices by the Bush administration have been motivated by an 
incumbent's natural desire to be re-elected, or whether this policy activism 
is part of a larger and long-term political strategy will become clear if Bush 
is re-elected. 
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Congressional inability to produce an energy bill that could address the 
nation's long-term energy needs was mirrored by the lack of agreement on 
energy policy among the nation's governors. After the August 2004 blackout, 
NGA lobbied Washington to pursue a more conservation-oriented policy 
and to foster federal-state cooperation in the development and integration 
of the nation's electricity infrastructure. 116 But NGA is itself divided by the 
conflicting interests of the 50 states that make consensus on a unified strategy 
difficult to attain. The NGA's policy positions on energy emphasize the 
traditional authority of states over economic development and land use, 
and as would be expected, NGA opposes efforts by the federal government 
to preempt state prerogatives.117 
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federal government; so did Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich. President 
Bill Clinton famously declared the era of big government was over. But the 
enactment of major new public programs, often with substantial price tags, 
in the first three years of the Bush presidency raises the question: has the 
era of "big government" returned? Bush has pushed hard for expensive 
programs such as the No Child Left Behind Act and the Medicare 
prescription drug benefit. He has pursued a steady policy of tax 
expenditures, in particular, by reducing taxation on capital accumulation. 
He has not stood in the way oflarge subsidies to farm interests and has not 
opposed the expansion of earmarked funds for pork-barrel projects. 118 
Further, the combination of tax cuts and increased spending has consumed 
the surplus funds that were on the federal government's ledger at the start 
of his term, and yet the president has shown little interest in stopping the 
slide into deep debt. It is little wonder that many conservative groups find 
this record "appalling" and a "disaster." 119 The level offederal activism and 
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administrations. Bush's policies abandon the Reagan and Gingrich efforts 
to shrink government. Instead, Bush aggressively uses government to weaken 
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is re-elected. 
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THE STATES 
The "silent revolution" of the mid-1960s to 1990 that modernized state 
governments refurbished their previous poor image and provided a key 
justification, along with the period's growing anti-Washington, DC, 
sentiment, for the devolution of many domestic programs. "Resurgent 
states" not only developed more capacity to administer federal programs, 
they also pursued their own initiatives. 121 With their updated institutions, 
states produced a record of policy accomplishments, and numerous observers 
claimed "the tide of centralization has turned and the balance of power has 
generally shifted from the federal government toward the states." 122 This 
"ascendancy of the states" also rested importantly on a dramatic rise in the 
professionalism of state government personnel, whether elected, appointed, 
or career officials. 123 The old patronage arrangements common in many 
states were replaced by merit systems and voters chose candidates with higher 
educational levels than in the past. 124 The revitalized states survived the 
recession of the early 1990s and even demonstrated sufficient political will 
to raise revenues necessary to suslain important programs. 125 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, state governments 
find themselves mired in the fourth year of their most severe financial crisis 
since the 1930s Depression. Few analysts now discuss states in the previously 
glowing terms; instead, the old labels such as the "sorry states" have 
reappeared. 126 Some of this shift in sentiment can be traced to the pattern 
of state responses to the fiscal crisis, particularly the reluctance of governors 
and legislators to raise revenues to protect important public functions. 127 
But a less noticed contributing factor is the continuing institutional weakness 
of state legislatures. "Forty-one states have part-time legislatures, and in 22 
of those states, legislators have no paid staff. Nineteen legislatures meet 
less than 80 days a year, and six convene only every other year. These same 
legislatures annually consider 150,000 bills and enact 75 times more laws 
than the U.S. Congress." 128 An especially egregious example of dysfunction 
is the New York Legislature, in which 95 percent of the laws passed do so 
without debate and votes may be cast by "empty seat" Iegislators. 129 By itself 
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the blame for the states' woes derives from the frustration of state and local 
government officials with three areas of federal policy-"block grants, 
unfunded mandates and federal preemption of local authority, and the 
impact of the state and federal deficits on local governments." 137 
Considerable evidence has long existed that the shift from cooperative 
federalism to a coercive one undercut the ability of states and localities to 
make and fund their own policy decisions. 138 The truly surprising blow to 
advocates of state and local government is the centralizing position taken 
by the Bush administration. Instead of coming to the aid of the states, 
Bush with the support of conservative allies has pushed vigorously for the 
expansion of national government powers. The leader of the political party 
long associated with a defense of states' rights has adopted policy positions 
that have subordinated the states and resulted in "a big, big turnaround" of 
established Republican dogma opposing federal power. 139 Little wonder 
then that state and local officials see the intergovernmental relationship as 
threatened and the ability of states and localities to function undercut. 
State Finances-Irnpruving, Less Worse, or Not Better? 
After three years of the worst fiscal crisis since the Depression, state 
governments, according to some observers, have begun to recover as 
indicated by increases in revenues and in year-end budget balances. 140 Other 
observers are less sanguine, emphasizing the "mega-choices" still necessary 
to avoid a financial relapse. 141 The good news for state governments is that 
FY 2004 revenues were up 5.4 percent over FY 2003 and projections for FY 
2005 signal further growth. 142 Consequently, 33 states began FY 2005 with 
a budget gap compared to 42 states with budget gaps in FY 2004} 43 The 
bad news is that many causes of the states' fiscal ills continue unchecked. 
For example, Medicaid spending is expected to grow by more than 13 
percent in FY 2005. 144 Similarly, states face rising costs from unfunded 
federal mandates such as new federal guidelines on voting technologies, 
from demographic pressures oflonger life spans and immigration, and from 
security against terrorism. State budgets may have "bottomed out," but as 
Ray Scheppach, NGA's executive director wryly noted, "it's going to get 
better, but not a lot better." 145 
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Because state governments must balance their budgets, they used several 
different means to resolve a nearly $200 billion cumulative budget shortfall 
over the past three years. First and foremost, states cut spending by $80.9 
billion, which covered 41.5 percent of the cumulative budget deficit. States 
also engaged in creative accounting and borrowing to generate $4 7. 7 billion, 
or 24.4 percent of needed funds. Reserve funds and other general funds 
were drawn down by $20 billion, or 10.3 percent. Tax and fee increases 
produced $26.4 billion, or 13.5 percent of needed monies. The Jobs and 
Growth Tax Relief Reduction Act of2003 gave states $20 billion of temporary 
grants, which accounted for 10.3 percent of the three-year cumulative state 
shortfall. 146 States relied on different budget tactics as they struggled to 
cope with the continuing crisis. In the first year (FY 2002), states emptied 
their reserve funds, which had grown to a year-end balance in FY 2000 of 
$48.8 billion (or 10.4 percent of state expenditures), did some creative 
accounting, and made some modest reductions in spending. But with 
revenues falling short by nearly 14 percent and with rainy-day funds drained, 
officials in many states resorted reluctantly to tax and fee increases of $11 
billion, but these new monies constituted less than 20 percent of the FY 
2003 deficit. Even significant accounting gimmicks and borrowing coupled 
with temporary federal aid could not stop the flow of red ink. 147 
Consequently, state officials were forced to slash spending by over $26 billion 
and, as a result, "in constant dollars, total state expenditures actually 
declined." 148 By FY 2004, states could do little else but continue to reduce 
expenditures by nearly $42 billion and further raise revenues, mostly in the 
form of higher fees and user charges, by $25.7 billion. 149 
The last time states faced budget shortfalls occurred during the recession 
of the early 1990s. Then states managed the fiscal situation by relatively 
equal parts of tax increases, spending cuts, and reserve funds coupled with 
other measures. Instead of expenditure reductions and revenue increases 
each contributing about one-third of the needed funds, this time state 
officials have relied more narrowly on spending cuts and other measures. 150 
The resistance to raise taxes is evident when one considers that in 1991 
states increased taxes 5.4 percent ($15.4 billion) over 1990 compared to a 
meager 1.5 percent ($7.8 billion) increase from 2002 to 2003. Some see in 
this "tax shyness" the lesson of the electoral defeats of Governors Florio 
and Cuomo after they had raised taxes in the previous recession. Current 
examples confirming the political risk of tax increases even to save vital 
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state programs include the rejection by Alabama voters of Governor Riley's 
$1.2 billion tax proposal, the defeat in Oregon of a bipartisan plan to raise 
$800 million, and the recall of Governor Davis in California. 151 
Another important comparison that sheds light on the current state fiscal 
crisis is the role played by federal aid. The cooperative federal-state 
relationship that prevailed during the "stagflation" of the 1970s engendered 
countercyclical relieffor the states in the form of General Revenue Sharing, 
the Antirecession Fiscal Assistance program, and the Intergovernmental Anti-
Recession Act. Congress designed these programs to stabilize the finances 
of state and local governments during a period of high unemployment and 
high inflation. The temporary aid to state governments provided in 2003 
resulted from a deal cut by Bush with a small number of Senate centrists 
who held pivotal votes necessary to the passage of his 2003 tax-cut bill. 152 
That the $20 billion temporary aid package was insufficient is obvious when 
it is compared to the $38 billion budget shortfall in California. 
Further, debate exists as to whether the $20 billion package actually helped 
the states. The GAO reported that the aid arrived 19 months after the end 
of the recession and thus was too late to make a difference. Furthermore, 
the GAO argues because the aid was allocated on a per capita basis, it was 
not well targeted to those states with the least ability to raise new revenues. 153 
Analysts at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) issued a study 
rebutting the GAO's conclusions. The CBPP report argues that the aid, 
although coming after the official end of the recession, arrived in 2003 while 
national employment-a key factor in state revenue capability-was lower than 
it had been in 2001. Additionally, half of the aid was targeted to Medicaid 
costs, the fastest growing component of state budgets, and the other half, 
although unrestricted, was a very modest amount of assistance ($10 billion) 
compared to the total budget shortfall ($195 billion)_l 54 
The divided opinion over whether Washington should aid states and 
localities when the national economy slows down is reflected in a public 
exchange of views between Barry Anderson, deputy director, Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO), who observed, "We almost always get it wrong, 
providing relief just as the economy starts picking up on its own," and Alice 
Rivlin, senior fellow, the Brookings Institution, who suggested, "At the very 
least, a program of countercyclical revenue-sharing would reduce the 
pressure on cities and states to make things worse by cutting services or 
raising taxes precisely when we should be avoiding those steps at all costs." 155 
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These competing assessments ofthe one-time federal aid to the states are a 
small sample of a larger debate on the obligations of the national 
government to state governments and on the merits of "fend-for-yourself 
federalism" in which each sphere of government functions independently 
of the others. 156 
The debates over the federal-state relationship are driven not just by 
principle or partisanship, but also by the policy realities of the state fiscal 
crisis. Massive reductions in state spending have had serious impacts on 
citizens. State aid to municipalities declined by 2.1 percent in 2003 and 
dropped another 9.2 percent in 2004. Kansas went so far as to end state aid 
to cities. 157 Given Medicaid's large presence in state budgets, all 50 states 
reduced or froze provider payments and enacted policies to constrain the 
growth in prescription-drug costs. Benefits were reduced in 35 states and 
eligibility reduced in 34 states. 158 These reductions occurred even with the 
infusion of $10 billion of federal aid. Similar reductions also occurred in 
the State Children's Health Insurance program.159 Mid-year FY 2002 budget 
cuts were made by 37 states, and in FY 2003 half the states further reduced 
spending on higher education, with an average cut of 5 percent (the range 
was from New Mexico's 7 percent increase to Colorado's 26 percent 
decrease) .160 To compensate, university governing boards approved double-
digit increases in tuition that drove tuition beyond the reach of an increasing 
number of students, even those assisted by Pell grants. Twenty-three states 
reduced child-care eligibility, thus making it harder for low-income, single 
parents to work, and in 34 states real per-pupil aid to school districts has 
declined since 2002. 161 Nineteen states froze public employee hiring or 
salaries. 162 The fiscal crisis undercut the "tough-on-crime" stance of many 
state legislators as "about two-thirds of all states have lowered prison 
sentences or begun steering convicts into incarceration alternatives such as 
drug treatment or community corrections programs-and in many cases, 
Republican governors and/or legislators have been leading the way."163 
The fiscal interdependency inherent in America's federal system is 
coming under increasing scrutiny over the ways its current features 
contributed to the states' fiscal crisis. Henry Cisneros, a former secretary 
of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development pointed out, 
''You cannot ignore the fact that the intergovernmental structure is tied to 
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revenues and their distribution .... And that makes it hard to look at this 
issue without looking at the fiscal relationships among the different levels 
of government."164 That unfunded federal mandates impose costs on states 
and localities has long been demonstrated, 165 but what has been striking is 
the failure to remedy the situation and the continuing imposition of new 
mandates even during the current fiscal crisis. Cost estimates of current 
mandates range from NCSL's $29 billion to CBPP's $73 billion, with the 
true figure somewhere in between. 166 
In addition to the widely discussed issue of unfunded mandates, Iris Lav 
and Andrew Brecher identify four other areas of federal policy that add to 
the states' red ink. 167 The three years of successive cuts in federal taxes, 
occurring simultaneously with the severe decline in state "own-source" 
revenues, have penalized states that did not "decouple" or alter the state's 
tax structure to accommodate the phase-out of the federal estate tax and 
the accelerated depreciation provisions for business. Second, current federal 
policy prohibits state and local governments from levying a consumption 
tax on transactions over the Internet, effectively denying state and local 
governments an estimated $45 billion in 2006. 168 A similar stop sign has 
been erected by the Federal Communications Commission with its ruling 
that cities may not collect revenue on the use of right-of-ways for cable 
modem services, even while the federal government continues to tax 
telecommunications. Third, Congress has failed for more than a decade to 
remedy a 1992 Supreme Court ruling barring states from imposing a sales 
(use) tax on vendors not physically present in the state. Since 2000, 34 
states have worked on the Streamlined Sales Tax Project with the aim of 
coordinating and harmonizing the differences in state tax laws so as to 
reduce the tax remittance burden on out-of-state vendors. While the work 
of the states on this project is not quite complete, it is not apparent that 
Congress would enact enabling legislation. Fourth, the national government 
continues to shift health-care services for the disabled and the low-income 
elderly from the federally funded Medicare program to the federal-state 
funded Medicaid program. Those persons enrolled in both programs are 
referred to as "dual eligibles," and it is the costs for these individuals, in 
particular, that is being shifted to Medicaid, primarily because Medicaid 
covers long-term care and pays for prescription drugs. Medicare will assume 
payment for prescription drugs for "dual eligibles" beginning in 2006, but 
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the new Medicare legislation requires states to remit back to the federal 
government 90 percent of the savings realized by Medicare's pickup of drug 
costs for the Medicaid program. Lav and Brecher estimate the combined 
costs of federal policies for the four years of the state fiscal crisis (2002-
2005) to be $175 billion. 169 If one subtracts the temporary 2003 federal 
aid, the net cost is $155 billion, or approximately 80 percent of the 
cumulative fifty state budget shortfall for the same period. It should be 
pointed out that the remaining $40 billion could have been covered by 
equal parts of state reserve funds and spending reductions equivalent to 25 
percent of actual cuts. 
Federal policy not only contributes significantly to the fiscal crisis, it also 
affects states differently. As one would expect, "states with a heavy reliance 
on federal funding for their budgets also are among those that have been 
hardest hit," in particular, Missouri, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, South 
Carolina, and South Dakota. 170 This list also demonstrates another effect of 
federal policy. The costs fall dis proportionally on many of the least affluent 
states. Third, the restrictions in federal tax policy impose a relatively larger 
burden on those states that depend on the sales tax for the bulk of their 
revenues, such as Florida, Nevada, Mississippi, Texas, and South Dakota. I7I 
The fiscal impact offederal policy is not limited to state government, its 
burden increasingly falls on local governments which are "at the bottom of 
the fiscal food chain." 172 Federal aid to municipalities, for example, has 
declined from about 15 percent of total general revenues in 1978 to 3.7 
percent in 2000; put another way, current federal aid to local governments 
is 75 percent less than what it was in 1980. Through much of this period, 
state aid to local governments stayed relatively flat, though municipalities 
from 1992 to 1997 did experience an average annual gain in state aid of 
approximately 4.6 percent. However, with the onset of the fiscal crisis, state 
aid to cities fell by 9.2 percent ($2.3 billion) in 2003 and 2004. 173 While 
federal and state aid to local governments has shrunk, programmatic 
responsibilities have been passed from the federal and state governments 
to local governments. 174 This "second-order" devolution simply exacerbates 
the fiscal mismatch that has been inherent in "fend-for-yourself' federalism 
since its onset in the Reagan era. 175 All levels of government have 
experienced growing fiscal stress for the last 20 years, and the outlook for 
the next 20 years is not better. "Despite some improvements in the states' 
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fiscal situations," says Scott Pattison, executive director of the National 
Association of State Budget Officers, "the picture is far from rosy. If the 
states were patients, you could say they are out of intensive care, but they're 
not out of the hospital yet." 176 
State Policy Actions 
State governments maintained their reputation as "laboratories of 
democracy" by enacting innovative and often controversial policies. A 
particularly busy area of state policymaking was health care. Rising 
prescription-drug costs prompted governors in both parties to confront the 
FDA over its ban on imported pharmaceutical drugs. The governors of 
Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Wisconsin issued executive 
orders creating websites that would direct state residents to reliable and 
safe pharmacies in Canada. Rhode Island permitted foreign pharmacies to 
obtain state licenses, and Canadian pharmacies may now fill prescriptions 
for the state's citizens. Other state actions to reduce prescription-drug costs 
include (1) the first-ever multi-state purchasing pool for Medicaid drug 
programs (Alaska, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Nevada, and Vermont), 177 
(2) laws requiring drug manufacturers to disclose prices, gifts, and marketing 
expenditures (Maine, Vermont), (3) laws lowering drug prices by setting 
up a state-run discount program (Hawaii), establishing a bulk purchasing 
program (Indiana), and directing state agencies to negotiate for rebates or 
lower prices (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island)Y8 
Kentucky removed the single most expensive drug (the antipsychotic 
Zyprexa) from the state's list of Medicaid preferred medications. This action 
pitted the state against the drug's manufacturer as well as against the 
National Alliance for the Mentally Ill and the Kentucky Consumer Alliance. 
While Kentucky succeeded in its effort to use similar but cheaper drugs in 
its Medicaid program, New York did not because Governor George Pataki 
vetoed a proposal and pushed through new legislation preventing the use 
of a preferred drug list by state Medicaid officials. The battle over 
antipsychotic drugs is one of the most challenging dilemmas in the effort 
to reduce drug costs. Brand-name drugs are extremely expensive, so there 
is an incentive to substitute generic or less expensive counterparts, but drug 
companies are reluctant to negotiate a discounted price because once they 
do so for one state, federal Medicare law requires the discount to be offered 
to all states. At the same time, the use of preferred drug lists restricts the 
choices available to physicians, but the lists are a tool by which state 
governments can control the fastest rising component of health care. 
Prescription drug prices went up 19 percent in 2003. 179 
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State efforts to ensure clean air and to slow global warming resulted in a 
new round of conflicts with power generators and with the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In November 2003, the EPA 
announced a series of exemptions to the New Source Review regulations 
that required new pollution controls be installed at older coal-burning power 
plants and oil refineries whenever they were renovated in ways that increased 
emitted pollutants. Additionally, the EPA terminated a number of on-going 
investigations into these older power plants. These federal actions provoked 
New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut to initiate lawsuits against midwestern 
and southern utility companies whose plants are the principal source of air 
pollution in the Northeast. 180 Eight states (California, Connecticut, Iowa, 
New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin) plus New 
York City in July 2004 sued four large utility companies plus the Tennessee 
Valley Authority because the 174 power plants operated by these enterprises 
burn fossil fuels and emit approximately 10 percent of the nation's carbon 
dioxide, a prime cause of global warming. 181 Less controversial state 
government actions to protect the environment included new air emission 
standards in Connecticut, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. Each of these states 
based its new laws on California's Low Emission Standard for automobiles. 182 
A long-running fight over the distribution of Colorado River water was 
ended in October 2003 when California agreed to reduce its use of this 
source. California has been in violation of the 1922 Colorado River Compact, 
which, among other provisions, limited the state to 4.4 million acre feet per 
year. Colorado and other states also dependent on the river for water 
increasingly resisted California exceeding its limit. A key element in 
obtaining agreement among the states was California's action to transfer at 
market prices in-state water from the agricultural areas of the Imperial Valley 
to the urban areas in the south. The agreement allows California 14 years 
in which to make this transition. 183 
In November 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that 
same-sex couples are constitutionally entitled to marry. Chief Justice 
Margaret H. Marshall's opinion declared: 
The question before us is whether, consistent with the Massachusetts 
Constitution, the commonwealth may deny the protections, benefits and 
obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the same sex 
who wish to marry. We conclude that it may not. It forbids the creation of 
second-class citizens .... Whether and whom to marry, how to express 
sexual intimacy, and whether and how to establish a family-these are among 
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the most basic of every individual's liberty and due process rights. And 
central to personal freedom and security is the assurance that the laws will 
apply equally to persons in similar situations. 184 
Previously, courts in Alaska and Hawaii had decided gay couples could 
not be denied the right to marry (but the state legislatures prevented further 
action) and the Vermont Supreme Court in 1999 upheld civil unions for 
homosexuals. But the Massachusetts high court is the first court to uphold 
a right to same-sex marriage. Its decision ignited a nationwide cultural war 
over the definition of marriage. 
The Massachusetts ruling initiated a fierce political battle between the 
state high court, the governor, and the state legislature. Governor Mitt 
Romney (R-MA) attacked the ruling by saying 
Marriage is an institution between a man and a woman. I will support an 
amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution that makes that expressly 
clear. Of course, we must provide basic civil rights and appropriate benefits 
to nontraditional couples, but marriage is a special institution that should 
be reserved for a man and a woman. 185 
The state senate sought guidance as to whether the high court would 
uphold a bill to grant the same rights and benefits of marriage to gay couples, 
but label the relationship a civil union. The court replied by reaffirming its 
decision to support the term marriage. 
The dissimilitude between the terms 'civil marriage' and 'civil union' is 
not innocuous. It is a considered choice of language that reflects a 
demonstrable assigning of same-sex, largely homosexual, couples to 
second-class status. [The bill] would have the effect of maintaining and 
fostering a stigma of exclusion that the Constitution prohibits. It would 
deny to same-sex 'spouses' only a status that is specially recognized in 
society and has significant social and other advantages. 186 
With the legal obstacles removed, same-sex couples rushed to get married, 
and the opportunity attracted homosexuals from other states. The governor 
invoked a 1913 state law preventing the marriage of out-of-state couples if 
the marriage would be void in their home state. But Provincetown, a 
community with a large gay population, voted to issue marriage licenses to 
out-of-state same-sex couples even if they had no intention of moving to 
Massachusetts. The town of Worcester also declared its intention to issue 
licenses to out-of-state couples. 187 
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The Massachusetts court's legal position differs sharply from the 1996 
federal Defense of Marriage Act and the laws of 38 states where marriage is 
defined as a heterosexual institution. Gay rights groups applauded the 
decision and claimed that it was in line with the legal reasoning in the U.S. 
Supreme Court's June 2003 decision overturning the Texas sodomy law, 
thereby legalizing gay sex. Conservative political groups and numerous 
religious denominations vehemently condemned the Massachusetts court. 
Tony Perkins, president of the Family Research Council, argued, "If same-
sex couples 'marry' in Massachusetts and move to other states, the Defense 
of Marriage Act will be left vulnerable to the same federal courts that have 
banned the Pledge of Allegiance and sanctioned partial-birth abortion." 188 
Opponents quickly mobilized to accelerate the passage of constitutional 
amendments banning same-sex marriages that have been introduced in 19 
state legislatures. 189 
Opposition to the Massachusetts court decision was not universal. Gavin 
Newsom, mayor of San Francisco, California, decided to recognize same-
sex weddings. More than 3,000 couples immediately sought marriage 
licenses. Because San Francisco is both a city and a county, and because 
marriage licenses are granted by county government, Mayor Newsom argued 
he had the authority to allow gay marriages. Newly elected Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger directed the state attorney general to file a lawsuit in San 
Francisco Superior Court to block same-sex marriages. Proponents of gay 
marriage immediately sued California over its laws defining marriage as 
between a man and a woman. 190 
Mrican-American legislators in some states found themselves in a 
quandary and often divided over the issue of gay marriages. The political 
constituency of many black legislators is based in local churches, many of 
which have a traditional theology on marriage. Although hometown voters 
demanded support for constitutional amendments banning gay marriage, 
black legislators expressed considerable reluctance to do so. Some Mrican-
American officials were uncomfortable with the use of laws and 
constitutional amendments to treat one group of people differently from 
another group. But others were offended by comparisons of the black civil-
rights struggles to the support of gay marriage. Georgia state representative 
Earnest Williams argued "You just can't equate sexual orientation to racial 
discrimination ... You can make a choice of who you want in your bedroom, 
but you can't choose your skin color." His colleague, state representative 
Georganna Sinkfield observed, "What I see in this is hate ... I'm a Christian, 
but if we put this in the Constitution, what's next? People with dark hair? 
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You're opening the floodgates for people to promote their own prejudice. "191 
Complicating the position ofblack legislators was how the issue of same-sex 
marriages would be used in the 2004 elections. The real possibility existed 
of this issue driving a wedge within the Mrican-American community and 
thereby siphoning off votes to Republican candidates. 
That state governments may enact laws regulating all manner of activity, 
including personal conduct and intimate relationships, rests importantly 
on their police power, which "in effect endows them with responsibility for 
protecting the health, morals, safety, and general welfare of the citizens." 192 
As is typical of the incremental development in many policy areas, the court 
decisions to permit same-sex marriages are the latest step in the more equal 
treatment of homosexuals. Over the past decade, the gay community and 
civil-rights activists have pressured state and local governments to provide 
equal benefits for domestic partners in areas such as health, property 
ownership, insurance, taxes, and child custody. This political activity has 
paid off as states such as California, Hawaii, Maine, and New Jersey have 
adopted various benefits for domestic partners. Some city governments 
across the country for nearly a decade have sought to create "gay-friendly" 
images so as to attract homosexuals with higher-than-average incomes and 
fewer dependents. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, exemplifies this welcoming 
orientation in its television ads touting itself as the "City of Brotherly Love 
and Sisterly Attraction." 193 
Students of federalism have long noted that policy changes have their 
roots in transformations in the larger culture and economy. Movies, music, 
and television in the 1950s contributed significantly to changing white 
attitudes toward black citizens, and so did actions by business corporations. 
The same pattern is repeating itself in respect to gay rights. Currently, 
approximately 20 television shows include gay characters or themes. 194 Since 
1990, Fortune 500 companies have offered "spousal equivalent" benefits to 
the domestic partners oflesbian and gay employees, and "more than 7,400 
companies now offer equal benefits to the same sex partners of their 
employees. "195 Companies with multi-state operations increasingly face more 
variation in state laws related to domestic partnerships, and this legal diversity 
complicates corporate human resource policies. At the same time, the 
market value of the gay population cannot be ignored by many businesses. 
Same-sex marriage, like stem cell research, is a multi-faceted issue that poses 
uncomfortable options for public officials. Like stem cell research, which 
191Andrew Jacobs, "Black Legislators Stall Marriage Amendment in Georgia: New York TimPs, 3 March 
2004 (Netscape version). 
192Richard H. Leach, Ammcan Fedna/ism (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970), p. 39. 
'"'Deborah Sharp, "Cities come out about wooing gays-and their dollars: USA Today, 8 December 
2003 (Netscape version). 
194lbid. 
19
'Bob Witek and Gary Gates, "Same-Sex Marriage: What's at Stake fur Business?" The Urban Institute, 
21 July 2004 (www.urban.org). 
government-federal or state-should make decisions is a critical choice that 
will affect future outcomes. 
Election Imbroglio 
The Massachusetts court decision on same-sex marriage may have caused 
the most widely felt political earthquake of the past year, but a potentially 
catastrophic tremor is building because of the fumbled efforts to avoid the 
election-procedures fiasco of 2000. Congress enacted The Help America 
Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 to assist state governments replace old-fashioned 
punch-card and mechanical-lever voting machinery with new technologies 
that would reduce confusion and error in vote counts, improve vote security, 
and raise the public's confidence in final tabulations. Although a number 
of states have had good experiences with established technologies such as 
optical scan readers, many states moved to purchase digital recording 
electronic (DRE) voting machines. DRE voting machines use technology 
similar to that used in automated teller machines (ATMs), in particular, 
touch-screen voting. The advantages, as described by their manufacturers, 
include more clarity in displaying vote choices, independent use by many 
disabled or elderly voters, lower costs for paper and maintenance, and less 
cumbersome administration by poll workers. Unfortunately, as some states 
started to utilize DRE voting machines, problems and even scandals 
emerged. Soon the list of complaints far exceeded the list of advantages-
lack of a paper audit trail by which votes can be verified by voters, insecure 
programming codes, cost of the machines, cost of training poll workers, 
lack of privacy, malfunctions, improper installation by vendors, and intrusion 
by hackers into vendor networks. 196 By mid-2003, several bills had been 
introduced in Congress to create a national voter-verified paper audit trail 
(VVPAT), but as of mid-2004, none of these bills had become law, even 
though nearly a third of the nation's voters would use DREs in the November 
2004 presidential election. The Brennan Center for Justice at New York 
University's School of Law and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 
issued a report on 30 June 2004 calling for prompt action to reduce the 
vulnerability of DRE equipment to tampering and mischief. 197 Some 
commentators pointed out that casino slot machines are significantly more 
secure and more stringently regulated than are the new digital voting 
machines. The nonpartisan League of Women Voters withdrew its previous 
support of the new technologies. 198 
Many of the snafus occurred in California, where about 40 percent of all 
touch-screen voting equipment is used. By the end of 2003, California, 
Washington, and Nevada had passed or had introduced legislation to require 
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VVPATs; other states did so in 2004. In April 2004, California Secretary of 
State Kevin Shelley decertified electronic voting machines in several 
counties, ordered some counties to halt plans to switch to the new machinery, 
mandated stricter security fore-voting machines, and issued new standards 
for creating and using verifiable paper trails with DREs. In some counties, 
vendors and officials agreed to go along with the secretary of state's orders, 
but in other locations such as San Bernardino, Riverside, and Kern counties, 
officials chose to sue over the decertification decision. Further purchases 
and installation of digital voting systems came to a standstill in the state, 
and the presidential election was a mere four months away. 199 
The federal Election Assistance Commission (EAC) established by HAVA, 
is supposed to serve "as a national clearinghouse and resource for 
information and procedures with respect to the administration of Federal 
elections" as well as "to establish minimum election administration standards 
for States and other units of local government with the responsibility for 
the administration of Federal elections ... "200 Pursuant to these purposes, 
Congress appropriated in 2003 $1.5 billion, of which $650 million for Title 
I activities was distributed by the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) 
to the states. These funds could be spent to (1) improve the administration 
of elections for Federal office, (2) educate voters concerning voting 
procedures, voting rights, and voting technology, (3) train election officials, 
poll workers, and election volunteers, ( 4) develop the state plan required 
for payments to be submitted under part 1 of subtitle D of title II, (5) 
improve, acquire, lease, modify, or replace voting systems and technology 
and methods for casting and counting votes, (6) improve the accessibility 
and quantity of polling places, including providing physical access for 
individuals with disabilities, providing nonvisual access for individuals with 
visual impairments, and providing assistance to Native Americans, Alaska 
Native citizens, and to individuals with limited proficiency in the English 
language, and (7) establish toll-free telephone hotlines that voters may use 
to report possible voting fraud and voting rights violations, to obtain general 
election information, and to access detailed automated information on their 
own voter registration status, specific polling place locations, and other 
relevant information. Because the four commissioners were not confirmed 
until mid-December 2003, the remaining $830 billion for FY 2003 was not 
disbursed. Compounding the aid situation was the HAVA requirement that 
states had to develop state election plans and have them published in the 
Federal Register at a cost to the EAC of $800 million. This led to a classic 
implementation predicament, as described by Leslie Reynolds, executive 
director of the National Association of Secretaries of State: "They [EAC] 
can't send out the grant money until the state plans are published, but they 
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don't have enough money in their budget to publish the state plans. So it is 
a bit of a mess right now."201 
The EAC has more on its agenda than publication of state election plans. 
HAVA mandated numerous changes in election procedures and standards, 
and the EAC is responsible for their enforcement. However, as the 
commission's chairman, DeForest Soaries,Jr., lamented, the agency suffers 
from a massive lack of funding,202 yet an increase from $1.5 billion to $10 
billion is only proposed for FY 2005. Tim Storey, an NCSL senior fellow, 
captured the implementation dilemma for the states by pointing out that: 
States are sort of reeling with the implementation ofHAVA, so the thought 
of a new federal mandate across the one [VVPAT] the states haven't even 
implemented-I'm not sure it's the right time for that ... HAVA mandates 
a lot of new equipment purchases, and of course, you don't want to get 
too far down the line and have the feds come back in and change the law 
again when you've already done a fair amount of purchasing.203 
If the shift to DRE voting machines in California and other states was 
problematic, the situation in Florida bordered on the chaotic. In 2001, 
Florida committed $32 million to reform its electoral system and to purchase 
optical scanning machines to replace the punch-card machines that were 
at the heart of the 2000 election fiasco. 204 Governor Jeb Bush declared the 
new voting system a "model for rest of the nation," but this optimism was 
dashed by blunders and failures that continued to make Florida, in the 
words of the Miami Herald, "a cause for shame."205 The Republican-led 
legislature, for example, passed new laws overhauling the state electoral 
system, but refused to change county election commissioners to a 
nonpartisan status. A new state rule excluded new touch-screen machines 
from manual recounts, prompting voting rights groups to file lawsuits to 
overturn the ban. The legislature also tried to keep registration records 
secret, but was stopped by the state courts. This judicial decision paved the 
way for an examination of voter rolls to remove suspected felons. The state 
sent each county a new list of registered voters whom it suspected were 
felons and asked the counties to verity the list, and if felons were discovered, 
to remove them from the voter rolls. 206 Given that this procedure was one 
of the biggest problems in 2000, especially associated with discrimination 
against black voters, civil rights groups were infuriated. The CNN television 
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network filed a lawsuit to obtain the state list in june 2004, and the Brennan 
Center sued the state to overturn the ban on felons, which the Center claims 
has affected more than one in four black men.207 To make matters worse, 
when the Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition filed a public records 
request for an audit of the 2002 governor's election, county officials said 
the records were missing from the new $25 million electronic voting network. 
Upon consulting with technicians from Elections Systems, and Software, 
the firm based in Omaha that produced the new voting system, county 
officials found the records on a misplaced disk.208 This appearance of a 
new disk raised more questions about the integrity of the new voting system. 
"It is becoming more and more clear every day-one obstacle after another, 
one mismanagement after another-that Florida's secretary of state's office 
cannot manage its election," said Sharon Lettman, deputy national field 
director of People for the American Way. For Lettman, "Democracy is in 
question in the state of Florida. "2o<J 
The country-wide doubts about the integrity of the new voting machinery 
prompted Democratic members of the U.S. House of Representatives to 
write to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Anan asking for international observers 
to monitor the November elections. Republicans reacted by passing 
legislation barring federal funds being used by the U.N. to monitor U.S. 
elections. However, the U.S. Department of State invited the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe to act as election monitors, and the 
Democrats agreed. The organization has a track record of election watching 
and had sent a small team in 2002 to monitor the midterm elections.210 
Serious concerns by African-American groups as well as other civil rights 
groups about Republican activities to keep minority voters away from voting 
booths underlies the calls for international monitoring of U.S. elections.211 
The California Recall 
California's political culture is often held to be the most exotic of the 50 
states, in part because it is the product of the three principal American 
political cultures originally identified by Daniel Elazar and in part because 
the state attracts a steady stream of new migrants, especially from overseas. 212 
The recall election of Governor Gray Davis confirmed the state's reputation 
for idiosyncratic politics. Once the secretary of state certified the recall 
petition as valid on 23 July 2003, the lieutenant governor, as required by 
law, had to set an election date sometime during the next 60 to 80 days; 7 
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October 2003 was selected. Two hundred and forty seven individuals filed 
candidacy papers, and the secretary of state certified 135 as official 
candidates. The variety among the candidates was stunning; the list included 
(a) elected officials such as the sitting Democratic governor, the Democratic 
lieutenant governor, Republican state legislators, and local officials of both 
parties, (b) candidates of third parties such as the Green, Natural Law, 
Libertarian, and American Independent parties, (c) numerous Republican 
and Democratic business and professional persons, (d) celebrities such as 
political commentator Arianna Huffington, porn star Mary Carey Cook, 
adult-magazine publisher Larry Flynt, television child actor Gary Coleman, 
and action-film star Arnold Schwarzenegger, (e) ordinary citizens, often 
with names that mimicked more famous personages such as Michael Jackson, 
Edward Kennedy, and Richard Simmons, and (f) individuals pushing unique 
causes, including "fairness for singles," the elimination of public schools, 
and amnesty for all illegal aliens.213 
While the candidates campaigned in what became labeled as a political 
"Gong Show," 214 the election itself was held hostage by several legal 
challenges. Most important, the ACLU filed a lawsuit in federal court to 
stop the election on the grounds that thousands of persons would be 
disenfranchised by the use of punch-card voting machines, as had happened 
in Florida. Because the counties still using punch-card equipment 
encompassed 44 percent of the state's population, and several of these 
counties accounted for large portions of the state's minority voters, the 
ACLU argued that the "equal protection" clause of the U.S. Constitution 
would be violated. A three-member panel of the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court 
decided to halt the election, but on further review by the full 11-member 
court, the election was reinstated a mere 14 days before its scheduled date.215 
The final winner of this turbulent election was Arnold Schwarzenegger, 
who exploited his celebrity name recognition and demonstrated his media 
and political savvy to define himself as a political moderate more interested 
in action than in partisan posturing. Although voters were split in their 
opinion of Schwarzenegger, an overwhelming percentage of voters 
disapproved of Governor Davis' performance; thus, Davis' defeat rested 
primarily on the voters' perception of his performance in office and less on 
the remedies proposed by his opponents.216 
Questions quickly arose as to whether Schwarzenegger, a political 
amateur, could solve California's fiscal crisis. Half of the state's money pays 
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for education, which both parties promised to protect. As with other states, 
medical and social services plus corrections and prisons consume nearly 
another two-fifths of the budget, and a spending limit, though toothless, 
has been in place since the late 1970s. On the revenue side, 33 percent of 
California's money comes from its income tax (compared to the national 
average of 24 percent), and 22 percent comes from the property tax 
(compared to 29 percent nationally). The state's tax structure, like most 
states, is relatively regressive, with families in the top one percent of income 
accounting for only 7 percent of total state tax-burden (compared to 11 
percent for the lowest 20 percent of families) .217 Schwarzenegger, with 
advice from counselors such as investment expert Warren Buffet and the 
newly appointed state finance director, Donna Arduin, who had held senior 
finance positions in Michigan, New York, and Florida, put forward a budget 
titled the California Recovery Plan. 218 The proposed budget would cut 
$3.8 billion in state spending, of which 42 percent would come from health 
and social services and 25 percent would come from transportation. 
Programs for the mentally disabled, for immigrants, and for universities 
also were axed. The plan relied on borrowing up to $15 billion to pay for 
the current state deficit and proposed a constitutional limit on state 
spending. Democrats derisively noted the plan was filled with reductions 
they had proposed previously, while conservative Republicans demanded 
even deeper cuts.219 In less than a month, the new governor discovered the 
power of the state legislature as it rejected his recovery plan. 
Governor Schwarzenegger went public and launched a statewide media 
campaign to convince voters to support his proposals to borrow funds to 
pay down the state debt and to reduce state spending. While the governor 
claimed that without approval of his plan the state would collapse into fiscal 
chaos, some of his opponents labeled the borrowing plan as an irresponsible 
transfer of the current debt to future generations. Other opponents 
demanded more radical budget cuts, and others argued for a temporary 
increase in income taxes. With the success of his governorship resting on 
the fate of two ballot measures (Propositions 57 and 58), the governor 
committed his own money as well as funds raised from his supporters and 
had over $10 million for a publicity blitz that overwhelmed his underfunded 
and politically divided opponents.220 Voters approved the plan in early 
March 2003, and by mid-May the governor sent the legislature a revised 
budget plan. 
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The new budget was crafted through a series of negotiations with 
important and powerful interest groups, including local government 
officials, teachers' unions, and the leadership of the state's colleges and 
universities. The governor convinced these groups to trade short-term 
budget cuts for promises of restored financing in the future. As he had 
done with the ballot proposals, Schwarzenegger went over the heads of the 
legislators and left them on the sidelines as he cut deals with many of the 
legislators' key constituents.221 Legislative opponents were not pleased by 
this strategy. It is important to note that the budget fight was not simply 
one of a Republican governor frustrated by "girlie-men" Democratic 
legislators.222 Republican legislators as well as local government officials 
were not pleased with parts of the plan, nor were they supportive of 
Democratic counter proposals. 223 The legislature's two-thirds vote 
requirement for passage of a budget, as it had done in previous years, 
contributed to the gridlock. This situation was nothing new to California 
nor to many other states as it resulted fundamentally from the intransigence 
of those opposed to any new taxes versus those opposed to any further cuts 
in human services programs and education. The 30 June constitutional 
deadline for an approved budget was ignored, and the bargaining continued 
to the end of July when a budget compromise appeared to gain sufficient 
support to be passed. The revised plan exemplifies the compromises 
necessary to obtain the required supermajority: $5 billion in borrowing, 
$1.5 billion in creative accounting, no new taxes, $5 billion in spending 
cuts, and an agreement to reform local government spending.224 
''Defend Yourself Federalism" 
Across the country, Virginia replayed the California budget battle, but 
the partisan lines were a Democratic governor squared off against a 
Republican legislature. However, the basic policy division was essentially 
the same-the collision of a "no new taxes" stance with a "no more cuts in 
expenditures" stance. Also, Virginia Republicans were as factionalized as 
California Republicans-between those who opposed taxes because they 
hampered economic growth and those who opposed reductions in state 
spending to maintain a quality of life that is critical to attracting new 
investment and skilled workers. The results were different; Virginia enacted 
tax increases.225 
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Solutions to state fiscal problems ultimately turn on how compromises 
can be crafted between these two camps. This political fault line has a long 
history in state government. The issue not only pits Democrats against 
Republicans, but in today's political alignment with numerous states (and 
the federal government) governed by Republican majorities, the issue splits 
Republicans into factions. These intraparty factions are also 
intergovernmental in composition because state aid to localities as well as 
local authority to tax are elements bargained over by the opposing factions 
and relevant interests. The intergovernmental relations of state and local 
policy problems is a critical political arena influencing their resolution. 
The ratcheting up of ideological positions, evidenced by the rise of ALEC 
and ALICE, raises the level of rancor and further hardens positions among 
state policymakers. Conflict occurs not just along the tax-resistance versus 
service-demand axis, but it also occurs along other issue axes of civil rights, 
culture, lifestyle, and morals. The fiscal problems minimize the money 
available, and the ideological polarization make~ the search for acceptable 
solutions even more difficult. As each order of government struggles with 
tax resistance in the face of growing service demands, heightened 
factionalization among policymakers increases barriers to 
intergovernmental solutions and has the effect of transforming "fend-for-
yourself' federalism into "defend yourselffederalism"-a Hobbesian version 
of competitive federalism. 
FEDERALISM IN COURT 
If the goal of the U.S. Supreme Court's "federalism revolution" has been to 
more firmly fix the boundaries of national versus state authority, then the 
Court stepped back from that goal by ruling against states in several cases 
during the 2003-2004 session. The Court's federalism revival, according to 
Shep Melnick, addresses two key legal issues ( 1) federal regulation of state and 
local government and officials, and (2) the jurisdiction of the federal courts.226 
These two issues are "closely linked" around the use of private lawsuits to 
interpret and enforce federal regulation of state and local government. 
"To the extent the Court reduces the jurisdiction of the federal courts it 
reduces federal control over subnational governments."227 Melnick further 
argues that critical to the effort to restrain the federal government is the 
Court's actions to restrict statutory claims against state and local 
governments. 
In the major federalism case decided this last term, the Court rejected 
state government immunity from lawsuits under Title II of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA). Six disabled persons in Tennessee, including 
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one who refused to crawl or be carried up to a second floor county 
courtroom to answer a criminal traffic complaint, sued the state for access 
to the court. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Sandra Day 
O'Connor, David Souter, Stephen Breyer, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
(concurring), ruled in Tennessee v. Lane that "states that fail to make their 
courthouses accessible to people with disabilities can be sued for damages 
under the ADA."228 Although the opinion confined itself narrowly to the 
question of access to the courts, the ruling affirmed Congress' power to 
enforce equal protection and due process guarantees by abrogating state 
government immunity to suit. Congress based its authority on the 
Fourteenth Amendment (Section 5) to open the states to private lawsuits 
for failure to provide a broad array of public services and programs as part 
of the ADA. A year earlier, the Court declared Congress properly removed 
state immunity from suit under the Family and Medical Leave Act. Lane, in 
a direct way, continues the Court's insistence that state governments may 
not hide behind the Eleventh Amendment to restrict civil rights. It is 
interesting to note that in the Family Leave decision Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist voted in the majority, but dissented in the Lane case. 229 
Another Eleventh Amendment case in which the Court did not protect 
states from lawsuits brought under federal statute was Frew v. Hawkins. 230 
Here, a class-action suit filed against Texas sought to hold state officials to a 
1996 court-approved consent agreement that required the provision of a 
broad range of procedures as part of the state's Medicaid programs. When 
Texas made changes in its Medicaid program, the plaintiffs sued, charging 
Texas reneged on its agreement. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals backed 
the state by rendering a decision under the Eleventh Amendment. But a 
unanimous Supreme Court overruled the Fifth Circuit and declared state 
officials were bound by the consent agreement, even if they were not in 
office at the time the agreement was signed. The Court did suggest the 
state could seek a revision of the agreement if it found the requirements 
burdensome. 
Other cases with a federalism effect included Aetna Health Care Inc. v. 
Davila and Cigna HealthCare of Texas Inc. v. Calad in which a unanimous 
Court ruled that the 1974 Employment Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) preempted the laws of Texas and nine other states from granting 
patients in managed care plans a right Congress had not provided - the 
right to sue the managed care company for damages caused by refusing to 
cover treatment a doctor had deemed medically necessary.231 Previously, 
the Fifth Circuit determined Congress had not intended to preempt damage 
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suits based on state law that defined "ordinary care." The Court based its 
reasoning on the managed care company's right to include or not include 
particular treatments in the coverage provided by one of its plans.232 In 
Sabri v. United States, the Court unanimously upheld Congress' authority to 
criminalize acts of bribery by local officials who administered federal grant 
funds. Here, the Court rested its decision on the spending clause.233 By a 
5-4 vote, the Court undercut a 1937 law that protected state governments 
from interference by the federal courts in the area of the assessment, levy, 
or collection of state taxes. A challenge to Arizona's use of income-tax 
credits for donations to private school education argued the credits 
constituted an unconstitutional support for religion. Arizona, in the Ninth 
Circuit Court, took the position that state courts were the proper venue to 
resolve a challenge to the state's tax policy. Although 40 states backed 
Arizona's position, the Ninth Circuit ruled the federal courts could hear 
constitutional challenges of state taxation. The Supreme Court in Hibbs v. 
Winn upheld the Ninth Circuit. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, 
noted: "In decisions spanning near a half century, courts in the federal 
system, including this court, have entertained challenges to tax credits 
authorized by state law."234 Justice Anthony Kennedy in dissent opined, 
"state courts are due more respect than this."235 
The Court was not consistently hostile to state governments. State laws 
in 20 states that require persons in suspicious circumstances to identify 
themselves when stopped by the police were upheld in Hiibel v. Sixth judicial 
District Court.236 The case arose out of a suspected domestic assault in Nevada 
where a rancher refused to provide identification to a deputy sheriff 
investigating a telephone report of violence in the cab of a truck parked 
along a rural road. Hiibel was charged with a misdemeanor and fined $250 
after refusing 11 requests to identify himself. The Nevada Supreme Court 
upheld his conviction, so Hiibel appealed on Fourth Amendment 
(unreasonable search) and Fifth Amendment grounds (self-incrimination). 
The existing Court position on a person's right to privacy had been 
enunciated in a 1968 decision, Terry v. Ohio, that permitted police to briefly 
detain and question citizens based on "reasonable suspicion" so that police 
may obtain information including a person's identity as a routine part of 
their work (known as a "Terry stop") .237 The question of identification 
during a "Terry stop" had never been clarified by the Supreme Court, and 
the case prompted the support of privacy advocates who feared in the 
Internet era the police would be able to obtain a large amount of information 
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about a person by merely entering his or her name in a database. By a 5-4 
vote, the Court held: "Obtaining a suspect's name in the course of a Terry 
stop serves important government interests. The request for identity has 
an immediate relation to the purpose, rationale and practical demands of a 
Terry stop ... answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so 
insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual 
circumstances."238 Justice Stevens strongly dissented to Justice Kennedy's 
majority opinion by arguing Hiibel had "acted well within his rights when 
he opted to stand mute." Libertarians were unhappy about the decision 
and commented that "the ruling makes it extremely difficult now for 
ordinary people to assert their constitutional rights against the government 
[the Court had] blurred the line between asserting your rights and 
committing the crime of obstruction ofjustice."239 
The Court also supported state authority in Nixon v. Missouri Municipal 
LeaffUe by holding the language of the Telecommunications Act was not 
sufficiently clear about whether it included the subdivisions of state 
government.240 This case continued the Court's position that if Congress 
intends to displace state authority, Congress has to craft legislation so that 
its intention was manifestly clear. 
However, State of Alaska v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency offers an 
example where the Court overruled a state decision because Congress did 
explicitly express its intent on the power of a federal agency.241 Alaska 
environmental officials wanted to permit the operators of the Red Dog zinc 
and lead mine to use less expensive pollution control equipment that would 
reduce pollutants by 30 percent. The EPA had ordered the mine to eliminate 
90 percent of the pollution. The Court decided by a 5-4 vote that Congress 
gave the EPA wide latitude to enforce environmental laws. Surprisingly, 
Justice O'Connor, who normally supports states' rights, joined the Court's 
nationalists (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter). Kennedy in dissent 
lamented, "Mter today's decision, however, a state agency can no longer 
represent itself as the real governing body. No matter how much time was 
spent in consultation and negotiations, a single federal administrator can 
in the end set all aside by a unilateral order. "242 
The Court's five-year debate over the role ofjudges and juries produced 
a 5-4 decision that invalidated the State ofWashington's criminal sentencing 
system. Washington allowed judges to increase a convicted defendant's 
sentence beyond the normal range for the crime. Ten other states also use 
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sentencing guidelines that permit judges some "guided discretion." The 
majority consisted of justices Scalia, Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. 
Scalia, in his majority opinion, held Washington's procedure violated the 
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. 'Juries, rather than a lone employee 
of the state, should make these decisions," Scalia argued in Blakely v. 
Washington. 243 The line up of justices in this case matched the line up in 
Apprendi v. New jersey, where four years ago New Jersey's hate-crime statute 
was invalidated because state judges could increase the sentence if they 
found the crime was motivated by bias.244 The majority then also reasoned 
that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt." The minority-O'Connor, Kennedy, Breyer, and 
Rehnquist-feared the new ruling would call into question federal guidelines 
where judges determine sentences based on a "preponderance of the 
evidence," the legal system's lowest standard of proof, and not on the highest 
standard of"beyond a reasonable doubt." Breyer, who was an author of the 
current federal sentencing guidelines, worried that the ruling would result 
in separate jury trials for sentencing, a procedure now used only in death 
penalty cases. As a result of Blakely, the federal guidelines may now be on 
uncertain constitutional ground, leaving at risk the validity of thousands of 
sentences, both state and federal. 245 
Two cases involving religion and state governments contained questions 
pertaining to federalism. Joshua Davey, a college student in Washington, 
was refused financial aid from the state's Promise Scholarship Program. 
The scholarship program grants awards to students on a merit basis and 
allows students to use the funds to attend colleges accredited in the state, 
even colleges with a religious affiliation. Davey wanted to study pastoral 
ministry, but he was denied aid because the scholarship program must 
comply with the state constitution's prohibition on the use of public funding 
for religious instruction. Thirty-seven states have this type of constitutional 
provision, often termed a Blaine amendment. The Supreme Court on a 7-
2 vote in Locke v. Davey upheld Washington's refusal to grant aid to Davey.246 
The ruling may be a setback for advocates of publicly financed vouchers as 
a mechanism for allowing parents "school choice," including schools offering 
religious instruction. In 2002, the Court supported vouchers as a neutral 
form of aid in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris. 247 Chief justice Rehnquist stated 
in his m<Uority opinion that Washington "has merely chosen not to fund a 
distinct category of instruction."248 The chief justice argued, "there are 
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some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required 
by the Free Exercise Clause."249 While the case put into opposition the two 
main constitutional clauses on religion, it also spoke to the authority of a 
state to develop its education policies as well as to whether state Blaine 
amendments are constitutional vis-a-vis the U.S. Constitution. 
The most controversial state court opinion delivered in 2003 was the 4-3 
ruling by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court that homosexual couples 
are constitutionally entitled to marry. This decision in Goodrich v. Department 
of Public Health was quickly appealed by state lawmakers and religious 
conservatives.250 The appeal was denied by a U.S. district court and by the 
First Circuit Court of Appeals in Boston. A stay request was filed with Justice 
Souter who referred it to the full Supreme Court. In May 2004, the Court 
refused to block the Massachusetts decision; thus, the nation's first state-
sanctioned marriages of same-sex couples could proceed. 251 The 
Massachusetts court decision was clearly based on the state's constitution, 
but it is also clear that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. 
Texas to strike down state government laws criminalizing sodomy established 
the position that homosexuals have a constitutional right to freedom, dignity, 
and "respect for their lives."252 
These cases suggest that the "Federalism Five" coalition of Rehnquist, 
Scalia, Thomas, O'Connor, and Kennedy is quite fragile and the "federalism 
revolution" has come to a standstill. The coalition fell apart in a number of 
cases, and its leader, the chiefjustice, often wound up in the minority. While 
there were some victories for state authority, there were more losses. A 
good example of the Court's lack of interest in federalism as a first principle 
is the decision in McConnell v. F.E.C.253 The case was a test of the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act, or "McCain-Feingold" (the names of its sponsors 
in the U.S. Senate), designed to reduce the influence of money in campaigns 
by banning unlimited donations to political parties. Opponents argued 
the law violated states' rights by limiting the ability of state political parties 
to raise funds. In a 300-page ruling, a 5-4 majority ignored the states' rights 
claim despite the chief justice's strong dissent. Kennedy, who was the swing 
vote, agreed to uphold the law's ban on "soft money"-monies "not subject 
to existing federal caps on the amount individuals may give and which is 
outside the old law prohibiting corporations and labor unions from making 
direct campaign donations"-only if it would apply to federal candidates 
and officeholders.254 It is also clear from McConnell, as well as many of the 
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other cases, that the rationale for rulings rests less on principles of a fixed 
federalism and more on the individual justices' political positions. In a 
sense, federalism rests as much on the "political safeguards" within the 
Supreme Court as it does on the "political safeguards" within the American 
larger political system. 
CONCLUSION 
By the end of2003, partisan divisions in the national capital and throughout 
the country produced a return to the "50-50 nation" of November 2000. 
Although Republicans con trolled all three branches of the federal 
government, this officially "unified" government behaved as if it were a 
"divided"government. The president continued to encounter stiff 
opposition to many of his proposals by members of his own party. 
Furthermore, certain factions within his party were openly critical, for 
different reasons, of presidential decisions. Some congressional Republicans 
criticized the conduct of the war on terror and the management of the 
post-invasion administration oflraq. Other Republicans were dismayed by 
Bush's abandonment of conservative fiscal principles. Others worried that 
Congress did not engage in sufficient oversight of the executive branch, 
and thus had lost power relative to the White House.255 
Within Congress, inter-institutional conflicts were common as the House 
and Senate frequently locked themselves into hardened positions that stalled 
important legislation such as the budget. The struggle for control of one 
chamber over the other was less a product of Republican inexperience with 
unified government than it was a product of each chamber's institutional 
features and how each chamber's leadership managed the institution. The 
majoritarian control by House Republican leaders clashed with the more 
consensual bipartisanship necessary in the Senate. But institutional features 
and management styles are not insurmountable obstacles to action if 
sufficient members in both chambers are willing to compromise. The inter-
institutional conflicts reflect serious ideological differences within and 
between the chambers. Factions such as supply-side advocates or traditional 
fiscal hawks prefer inaction to any compromise of principle. To obtain 
votes from philosophical true believers, legislative leaders were forced to 
resort to unusual legislative provisions (e.g. the temporary nature of the 
tax cuts). 
However, the increasing polarization among elected officials encompasses 
more than different positions on economic matters. The current inter-
and intra-party clashes are fueled by issues of civil rights, culture, lifestyle, 
morals, and religion, and the positions expressed by elected officials are 
grounded in divisions within the general public. The rifts within American 
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society over issues such as gay rights, the war in Iraq, the place of religion in 
the public sphere, freedom of expression in the media, have produced, 
according to some observers, "two parallel universes [in which] each side 
seeks to reinforce its thinking by associating with like-minded people."256 
While debates exist over the validity of the divided nation thesis,257 the 
polarization of the nation's populace around strong ideological viewpoints 
has become so evident that the mass media has labeled this phenomenon 
as "Red-Blue America." The sharp divisions within the general public offer 
opportunities for candidates and parties to exploit for their advantage. If 
political leaders such as a president take a public position on one side of a 
hot-button issue, the effect is to increase the degree of polarization as 
compared to an official who searches for common ground. The clash of 
cultures and lifestyles trumps the democratic art of compromise. The spirit 
of federalism embodied in the ideas of"shared rule," respect for the integrity 
of others, and the pursuit of the common good in society withers in an 
ideologically driven political environment. Will the behavior of the 
candidates and parties in the 2004 presidential election bridge the gap 
between Red and Blue America or will it reinforce the division? 
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